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[133] 
Contractual Innovation in Venture Capital 
John F. Coyle* and Joseph M. Green** 
Scholars agree that contractual innovation, though sometimes slow to occur, can and 
will take place if certain conditions are met. This Article argues that the evolution of 
certain venture finance contracts over the past decade constitutes a prime example of 
such innovation. 
 
Drawing upon interviews with some of the leading venture capital attorneys in the 
United States, this Article chronicles how two types of venture finance securities—the 
convertible note and convertible preferred stock—and related contracts evolved in 
response to technological advances that greatly reduced the cost of launching a start-up 
technology company. Prior to 2005, individuals who invested in early-stage technology 
companies would typically invest alongside the founder of the new venture by 
purchasing shares of common stock. Venture capital funds, which invested more 
substantial amounts of capital at later stages in a company’s development, would 
typically receive convertible preferred stock. And in situations in which a company 
needed a loan from its current investors to keep it afloat until a new infusion of capital 
could be raised—a so-called bridge loan—investors would typically receive promissory 
notes that were convertible into equity at a future date. Each of these types of 
investment contracts reliably matched up with a particular mode of financing 
transaction. 
 
Around 2005, however, this stable contractual infrastructure began to change. A 
number of technological developments—including, most significantly, the rise of cloud 
computing—led to a dramatic decline in the costs of launching a technology company. 
In the wake of these changes, the contracts used by investors to structure their 
investments in these ventures evolved in two important ways. First, convertible notes, 
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previously used primarily in the context of bridge financing, were increasingly used to 
provide financing to early-stage technology companies. Second, investors in early-stage 
technology companies increasingly turned to much simplified versions of traditional 
convertible preferred stock documents to structure their investments. While these 
changes have fundamentally reshaped the contractual infrastructure of early-stage 
venture finance in the United States, they have attracted scant attention in the legal 
literature to date. This Article aspires to fill that gap. 
 
This Article also draws upon this account of evolution and change in the venture capital 
space to develop insights into the process of contractual innovation more generally. It 
argues that current theories of contractual innovation only partially explain the changes 
to these venture finance contracts over the past decade. It argues that while attorneys 
can and do serve to drive the process of contractual innovation, the success of these 
efforts is highly dependent upon partnerships that they develop with the end users of 
these contracts. Finally, this Article suggests that the substitution of one type of 
contract for another—using equity instead of debt, for example—is itself an innovation 
that has gone largely unappreciated in the contractual innovation literature. 
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Introduction 
The study of the process by which contracts evolve and change—
known as the process of contractual innovation—has historically 
attracted little attention from legal scholars. In recent years, however, 
this has begun to change. Some scholars have sought to develop a 
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general theory of contractual innovation.1 Others have analogized the 
process of contractual change to the process of technological change.2 
Still others have sought to determine which groups are most likely to 
pioneer contractual innovations.3 As a result, today there is a burgeoning 
literature devoted to the project of explaining how and why contracts 
evolve over time. 
This Article contributes to this literature by exploring how a specific 
subset of contracts—those used by investors providing capital to early-
stage technology companies—has evolved over the past decade.4 Prior to 
2005, individuals who invested in early-stage companies would typically 
invest alongside the founder of the new venture by purchasing shares of 
common stock.5 Venture capital funds, which invested more substantial 
amounts of capital at later stages in a company’s development, would 
typically receive convertible preferred stock.6 And in situations in which 
a company needed a loan from its current investors to keep it afloat until 
a new infusion of capital could be raised—a so-called bridge loan—
investors would typically receive promissory notes that were convertible 
into equity at a future date.7 Each of these types of investment contracts 
reliably matched up with a particular mode of financing transaction. 
Around 2005, however, this stable contractual infrastructure began 
to change. A number of technological developments—including, most 
significantly, the rise of cloud computing—led to a dramatic decline in 
the costs of launching a start-up company.8 In the wake of these changes, 
the contracts used by investors to structure their investments in these 
new businesses evolved in two important ways. First, convertible notes, 
previously used primarily in the context of bridge financing, were 
increasingly used to provide financing to early-stage technology 
companies.9 Second, investors in early-stage technology companies 
increasingly turned to much simplified versions of convertible preferred 
stock documents to structure their investments.10 While these changes 
have fundamentally reshaped the contractual infrastructure of early-
 
 1. See generally Stephen J. Choi et al., The Dynamics of Contract Evolution, 88 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 
1 (2013) (discussing theories of contractual innovation) 
 2. Kevin E. Davis, Contracts  as Technology, 88 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 83, 83 (2013). 
 3. Florencia Marotta-Wurgler & Robert Taylor, Set in Stone? Change and Innovation in 
Consumer Standard-Form Contracts, 88 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 240, 247–48 (2013). 
 4. We use the term “technology companies” as shorthand for Internet companies, digital media 
companies, and companies whose primary product is software. The term does not encompass 
healthcare companies or companies that design and build computer hardware. 
 5. See infra Part II.A. 
 6. See infra Part II.B. 
 7. See infra Part II.C. 
 8. See infra Part III. 
 9. See infra Part IV. 
 10. See infra Part V. 
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stage venture finance in the United States, they have attracted scant 
attention in the legal literature to date. This Article aspires to fill that 
gap. 
This Article then draws upon this account to contribute to the 
growing body of literature that explores the contractual innovation 
process more generally. To date, most scholarly work in this area has 
relied upon contracts that are available to the public, sovereign debt 
contracts in particular.11 This Article aims to bring a new collection of 
private agreements—early-stage venture capital contracts—into the 
contractual innovation literature.12 It also seeks to provide partial 
answers to two questions that have dominated the scholarly work on 
contractual innovation. First, is it possible to develop a general theory of 
contractual innovation capable of predicting when such innovations are 
most likely to occur? Second, what role do attorneys play in the process 
of contractual innovation? With respect to the first question, we argue 
that existing theories of contractual change that developed primarily in 
the context of sovereign debt contracts fail to fully predict how the recent 
process of contractual innovation has played out in the context of 
venture finance. With respect to the second question, we argue that while 
attorneys can and do play an outsized role in driving the process of 
contractual innovation, the success of these efforts in the context of 
venture finance is highly dependent upon partnerships that attorneys 
develop with the end users of these contracts. We also argue that the 
substitution of one type of contract for another—using equity instead of 
debt, for example—is itself a form of contractual innovation that has 
heretofore gone largely unappreciated in the contractual innovation 
literature. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I surveys the existing 
literature on contractual innovation and sets forth our methodological 
approach. Part II details the status quo that prevailed in the world of 
venture finance contracts in the years prior to 2005. Part III identifies the 
various technological and economic shocks that disrupted this status quo 
beginning roughly in 2005. Part IV chronicles the rising popularity of the 
convertible note as a tool for providing seed financing and discusses a 
number of contractual innovations that occurred specifically with respect 
to these notes. Part V chronicles a set of parallel innovations that sought 
to “simplify” the documents used in the classic Series A financing done 
by venture capitalists and describes attempts by some market actors to 
promulgate model versions of these new documents. Part VI then draws 
upon the description and analysis set forth in the previous Parts to 
 
 11.  See infra notes 53–57 (discussing widespread use of sovereign debt contracts in contractual 
innovation literature). 
 12. See infra Part I.C (discussing interview methodology). 
Coyle_26 (TEIXEIRA).DOC (Do Not Delete) 11/26/2014 2:19 PM 
138 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 66:133 
develop deeper insights into the process of contractual innovation more 
generally. 
I.  Theories of Contractual Innovation 
This Part surveys the existing academic literature regarding how and 
why contractual innovation occurs. It first examines several reasons why 
contractual innovation is often slow to take place. It then explores the 
reasons why innovation sometimes occurs notwithstanding these 
obstacles. This Part concludes by discussing the methodology that we 
used to explore the process of contractual innovation in the context of 
early-stage venture finance contracts. 
A. Obstacles to Innovation 
Scholars have identified a number of reasons why contractual 
innovation is often slow to occur.13 These reasons include: (1) sticky 
default rules, (2) learning benefits, (3) network benefits, (4) weak 
intellectual property protection, and (5) inertia. 
First, some scholars have argued that state-supplied default rules 
(such as the Uniform Commercial Code) may have the perverse effect of 
creating barriers to contractual innovation by making it more costly for 
parties to vary these terms by express agreement.14 Particularly when the 
parties’ contracting relationship is informed by considerations that are 
external to the conduct of the business—or where there is a chance that a 
proposed modification to a default term could prompt the other party to 
draw an adverse inference—one party may be reluctant to suggest any 
changes to default rules, even if they would be value enhancing.15 
Whatever benefits contractual default rules may offer, therefore, the 
stickiness of such terms may serve to discourage contractual innovation 
in some cases.16 
 
 13. According to classical economics, contracting parties will bargain with one another to produce 
the most efficient distribution of resources, assuming there are no transaction costs. See generally R. 
H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & Econ. 1 (1960). Where transaction costs exist, however, 
contracting parties will often look to past contracts and use these as starting points for negotiations. 
Transaction costs also make these parties less likely to dicker over terms. Consequently, the process of 
contractual innovation proceeds more slowly in the real world than in a world in which transaction 
costs do not exist. 
 14. Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the 
Interactions Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 Calif. L. Rev. 261, 263–64 (1985) (“We 
argue that the very benefits of the state’s efforts to imply and standardize widely useful terms create 
hitherto overlooked barriers to innovative forms of contractual agreement.”). 
 15. Lisa Bernstein, Social Norms and Default Rules Analysis, 3 S. Cal. Interdisc. L.J. 59, 70 
(1993) (discussing relational factors and whether norms affect parties’ behavior); Kathryn E. Spier, 
Incomplete Contracts and Signalling, 23 RAND J. Econ 432. 432 (1992) (discussing the possibility of 
adverse inferences). 
 16. Omri Ben-Shahar & John A. E. Pottow, On the Stickiness of Default Rules, 33 Fla. St. U. L. 
Rev. 651, 655–60 (2006) (surveying recent literature). 
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Another potential barrier to innovation is the learning benefits that 
accrue to particular contract terms over time.17 Widely used contract 
provisions have, by definition, been analyzed and dissected by many 
different users across many different contexts.18 In these cases, it may be 
that users become reluctant to make any changes to the provisions 
because they do not want to undercut the clear meaning that the term 
has attained over the course of many years.19 These incentives may be 
felt especially keenly by associates in law firms who are wary of making 
changes for which they might subsequently be blamed.20 In cases where 
the learning benefits that have accrued to a particular contractual 
provision are significant, therefore, the actual and perceived costs of 
switching to a new provision may deter contractual innovation.21 
Network effects—or the benefits that attach as more and more 
individuals are exposed to a particular contract term—provide still 
another potential obstacle to contractual innovation.22 Just as the utility 
of owning a telephone increases as more people buy telephones, so too 
does the utility of a particular contract provision increase as more people 
use that contract provision. In contrast to the learning benefits described 
in the previous paragraph, which run exclusively from early to later 
users, network benefits apply to everyone who adopts a particular 
 
 17. Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in Corporate Contracting 
(or “The Economics of Boilerplate”), 83 Va. L. Rev. 713, 718, 720–21 (1997) (observing that learning 
benefits “arise[] when a firm adopts a contract term that has been commonly used in the past, 
regardless of whether other firms will continue using it in the future”). 
 18. Id.  
 19. Michael Klausner, The Contractarian Theory of Corporate Law: A Generation Later, 31 J. 
Corp. L. 779, 795 (2006) (“[E]ven before a term is widely litigated lawyers develop shared 
understandings of how the courts will apply the term, and they advise clients on the basis of these 
understandings. These shared understandings, which are common among Delaware lawyers for 
example, further enhance the value of commonly used terms.”); Mark C. Suchman & Mia L. Cahill, 
The Hired Gun as Facilitator: Lawyers and the Suppression of Business Disputes in Silicon Valley, 21 
Law & Soc. Inquiry 679, 704 (1996) (“[When] contracts come to routinely incorporate clauses that 
have been ‘decided’ years before, lawyers may hesitate to rock the boat by overzealously promoting 
client interests on specific issues.”). 
 20. Claire A. Hill, Why Contracts Are Written in “Legalese”, 77 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 59, 71 (2001) 
(“[F]ollowing the standard makes avoiding a bad outcomethat is, a bad outcome for which the 
lawyer is blamed—easier and less costly.”); see George G. Triantis, Improving Contract Quality: 
Modularity, Technology, and Innovation in Contract Design, 18 Stan. J.L. Bus. & Fin. 177, 199 (2013) 
(“[H]ierarchy and collegiality within firms discourages individual lawyers from making significant 
changes to precedent forms, at least partly to avoid offending the partner who authored the provision 
in question.”). 
 21. Kahan & Klausner, supra note 17, at 728 (“Switching costs may create pressure for a firm to 
avoid adopting terms in a new contract that deviate from those in its existing contracts. This may be 
true even if the previous terms are inferior to ones that have since been developed and even if the 
more recently developed terms have become common.”). 
 22. See id. at 725–26; see also Steven Walt, Novelty and the Risks of Uniform Sales Law, 39 Va. J. 
Int’l L. 671, 689 (1999) (“Network effects . . . produce a suboptimal adoption of sorts of contract 
terms . . . only if the market for contract terms exhibits network externalities.”). 
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contract provision regardless of the time of adoption.23 The possibility 
that a new contract provision may not ultimately be widely adopted—
thereby failing to reap much in the way of network benefits—thus serves 
to disincentivize the production of novel or idiosyncratic contract 
terms.24 
Weak intellectual property protections for contract language also 
serve to deter innovation.25 Contracts are easy to copy. Potential 
innovators know this. Consequently, potential innovators also know that 
they are unlikely to capture all of the benefits from the resources that 
they invest in developing any contractual innovation.26 If that innovation 
turns out to be useful, then other users will appropriate it for their own 
contracts without compensating the inventor.27 Again, the overall effect 
is to discourage innovation. 
Finally, simple inertia can play an important role in impeding 
contractual innovation. Once a contract provision becomes part of a 
standard form, it can be surprisingly difficult to remove. Mitu Gulati and 
Robert Scott have recounted the story of one particular contract 
provision (the pari passu clause) that became a standard term in 
sovereign debt contracts almost a century ago.28 This provision, they 
write, “was promptly absorbed into the lumpish boilerplate of such 
contracts and then came to be replicated, thousands upon thousands of 
times, even while the knowledge of its origin and purpose insensibly 
faded from the minds of its remote drafters.”29 Inertia and inattention, in 
other words, may also help to explain why contractual innovation is 
sometimes slow to occur. 
 
 23. Kahan & Klausner, supra note 17, at 726. 
 24. Id. at 734 (identifying potential problems stemming from network externalities); see Michael 
Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 Va. L. Rev. 757, 764 (1995) 
(“[N]etwork externalities introduce the possibility that corporate contracts that maximize individual 
firm values will not be socially optimal.”). This point is especially important in the world of venture 
capital finance, where standardized form contracts are the norm. Pressure to minimize friction and 
save on legal fees yields widespread agreement to use these forms without much negotiation, leading 
to less innovation from lawyers and parties alike. 
 25. Davis, supra note 2, at 106 (“Contracts are protected by copyright . . . but only the most 
blatant and literal forms of copying violate that copyright.”). 
 26. Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 
86 Calif. L. Rev. 479, 571 n.399 (1998) (“[I]n practice, lawyers freely copy contractual innovations 
from other lawyers without paying for them.”); Walt, supra note 22, at 689 (“Over a range of use, a 
contract term exhibits nonexclusivity: a contracting party cannot feasibly exclude others from 
benefiting from her own use of a contract term. The infeasibility of exclusion means that the party 
cannot realize the entire benefit resulting from her use.”). 
 27. See Lemley & McGowan, supra note 26; see also Davis, supra note 2, at 105. 
 28. See generally Mitu Gulati & Robert E. Scott, The Three and a Half Minute Transaction: 
Boilerplate and the Limits of Contract Design (2013). 
 29. Id. at 2; see Hill, supra note 20, at 70 (suggesting attorneys meet expectations by “using time-
tested forms, and changing them as little as possible”). 
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B. Conditions Conducive to Innovation 
Notwithstanding the various obstacles discussed above, contractual 
innovation can and does take place. In recent years, a number of scholars 
have sought to identify the conditions and precise circumstances under 
which such innovation is most likely to occur.30 
Choi, Gulati, and Posner, for example, recently hypothesized that 
the process of contractual innovation occurs in three stages.31 In the first 
stage, a particular standard form dominates the market.32 Stage two 
begins when some external “shock” disrupts the market and prompts 
marginal market players to propose changes to the prevailing standard.33 
This shock may be caused by advances in technology, legal or regulatory 
changes, or changes in market conditions.34 In stage three, high-volume 
or high-status intermediaries such as law firms recognize that some 
change is inevitable and each begins to promote its own vision of what 
the new standard should be.35 During stage three, there will be multiple 
competing standards jockeying for market share.36 After a period of 
time, however, one standard emerges as the market leader and becomes 
the new standard form until another external shock occurs.37 
Other scholars have sought to determine precisely who is most 
likely to develop a lasting contractual innovation. The recent scholarship 
has focused primarily on three groups: (1) contract users, (2) high-
volume intermediaries such as law firms, and (3) trade associations. 
 
 30. These efforts constitute an explicit acknowledgment that the various obstacles to innovation 
discussed in Part I.A collectively provide a powerful deterrent to innovation. Rather than assuming 
that the parties will negotiate new terms that reflect their collective interests in most casesas per 
classical economic theory—these scholars acknowledge that the obstacles to innovation are sufficiently 
serious that truly novel contract terms will only arise when certain conditions are met. 
 31. Choi et al., supra note 1, at 10. 
 32. Id. 
 33. See id.; see also id. at 36 (“Prior to any shock, existing standards are sticky and innovation is 
sparse . . . .”). 
 34. Triantis, supra note 20, at 192–93. But see W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Sovereign Immunity and 
Sovereign Debt, 2014 U. Ill. L. Rev. 67 (questioning whether major shifts in boilerplate financial 
contracts require an exogenous shock to occur). 
 35. Choi et al., supra note 1, at 10; id. at 37. (“Once enough market participants expect a shift in 
the standard . . . top market participants switch from being defenders of the status quo to promoters of 
their own individual visions of the anticipated new standard.”). 
 36. Id. at 37 (“Competing visions can then lead to multiple new standards at stage three . . . .”). 
 37. The broad contours of this analytical framework have been echoed by a number of other 
scholars who have studied the process of contractual innovation. See Ronald J. Gilson et al., Contract 
and Innovation: The Limited Role of Generalist Courts in the Evolution of Novel Contract Forms, 
88 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 170, 172 (2013) (“Highly stylized, the trajectory of innovation in contract we find is 
this: Private actors respond to exogenous shocks in their economic environments by changing existing 
structures or procedures to make them efficient under the new circumstances.”); Barak Richman, 
Contracts Meet Henry Ford, 40 Hofstra L. Rev. 77, 83 (2011) (“During an era of incremental 
technological change, firms are often well-served by rigid structures, but . . . ‘technological 
discontinuities’ or market shocks dramatically alter the market environment . . . . Often, only new or 
entrant firms can organize their routines around the new technology or market environment . . . .”). 
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First, the parties themselves could develop contractual innovations 
on their own initiative; economic theory predicts, after all, that the 
parties will introduce new terms to their agreements whenever the 
perceived benefits from the innovation exceed the perceived costs.38 One 
recent study of standard form licensing agreements found that sellers 
introduced a significant number of (mostly pro-seller) changes to these 
agreements over time.39 That same study found, however, that not all 
contract users are equally likely to innovate and that innovation is most 
likely to occur among “younger, growing, and large [companies], as well 
as [companies] with legal departments.”40 So while some contract users 
are likely to innovate provided the conditions are right, many others are 
decidedly less likely to do so. 
Second, intermediaries such as law firms are also well-positioned to 
generate contractual innovations.41 In contrast to contract users, who 
may negotiate particular types of agreements only infrequently, many 
law firms draft and negotiate these agreements in significant volume.42 
Consequently, attorneys at large law firms will typically have access to a 
significant number of existing contracts that may be mined for innovative 
provisions.43 Lawyers also have the ability, at least in principle, to spread 
the costs of innovation across multiple clients, which may enable some 
law firms to develop contractual innovations in situations in which the 
costs of innovation would be prohibitive if borne by a single client.44 
Attorneys may also be incentivized to develop innovations in order to 
signal to potential clients that they are on the cutting edge of the legal 
profession.45 
Finally, trade associations may play a key role in developing a 
number of novel contract provisions in certain industries.46 These groups 
 
 38. See Marotta-Wurgler & Taylor, supra note 3, at 247–48 (discussing innovations to consumer 
contracts drafted by in-house legal department).  
 39. Id. at 257 (noting that “twenty-five of the thirty-two terms [studied] became relatively more 
pro-seller” relative to the otherwise applicable default rules and that “nineteen changes are common 
enough to be statistically significant.”). 
 40. Id. at 244. 
 41. Choi et al., supra note 1, at 7–8, 10, 16 (discussing innovations in sovereign bond documents 
drafted by law firms). 
 42. See Davis, supra note 2, at 116. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Marotta-Wurgler & Taylor, supra note 3, at 245. 
 45. See Triantis, supra note 20, at 200–01 (discussing Wachtell’s developing the poison pill and 
subsequent effort to market it to potential clients). 
 46. See Davis, supra note 2, at 119–21 (discussing why trade associations are innovative and the 
innovations they promulgate); Kevin E. Davis, The Role of Nonprofits in the Production of 
Boilerplate, 104 Mich. L. Rev. 1075, 1078–81 (2006) [hereinafter Davis, Role of Nonprofits] 
(observing that trade associations seem to play a substantial role in producing boilerplate in many 
industries); Goetz & Scott, supra note 14, at 293 (“Certain private organizationssuch as trade 
organizations and law firmscan partially overcome the property rights problem that discourages 
attempts at contractual innovation.”). 
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are funded through dues paid by their members and are therefore able to 
spread the costs of developing these innovations across many contract 
users.47 In addition, trade associations are able to credibly assure 
prospective users—their members—that the innovations they develop 
will also be adopted by other users.48 Some scholars have also argued 
that trade associations may also be better able to attract high-quality 
volunteer labor, thereby enabling them to produce innovations at a 
relatively low cost.49 
In the context of this broader discussion about which groups are 
most likely to innovate, there exists a related discussion about which 
individuals within these groups are most likely to innovate successfully. 
One hypothesis posits that high-status actors with significant market 
share will drive the process of innovation.50 A counter-hypothesis posits 
that innovation is most likely to originate from marginal players that 
stand to gain market share as a result of any disruption to the status 
quo.51 To date, the empirical studies that have sought to answer this 
question have produced mixed results.52 
In summary, the contractual innovation literature to date has 
concerned itself with two primary questions. First, what are the general 
conditions under which contractual innovations are most likely to occur? 
Second, who is most likely to pioneer a successful contractual 
innovation? With these questions in mind, let us now turn to the issue of 
methodology and the ways by which researchers might go about seeking 
answers to each of these questions. 
 
 47. In the start-up context, the National Venture Capital Association developed its own open-
sourced form of contracts for venture capital investments that have become widely used and 
referenced since their introduction. See Daniel M. Hauserman, The Case Against Statutory Menus in 
Corporate Law, 9 Hastings Bus. L.J. 45, 52 (2010). 
 48. Davis, Role of Nonprofits, supra note 46, at 1077. 
 49. Id. A number of pioneering contractual innovations were developed and subsequently 
promulgated by trade associations. See, e.g., Int’l Chamber of Commerce, Incoterms (2010) 
(outlining International Chamber of Commerce rules regarding domestic and international trade 
terms); Model Legal Documents, Nat’l Venture Capital Ass’n, available at 
www.nvca.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=108&Itemid=136 (offering Model 
Series A Preferred Stock Purchase Agreement). 
 50. Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Innovation in Boilerplate Contracts: An Empirical 
Examination of Sovereign Bonds, 53 Emory L.J. 929, 935 (2004).  
 51. Id. at 936. 
 52. Compare Choi & Gulati, supra note 50, at 936 (suggesting that high-volume attorneys are 
more likely to propose innovations), and Kahan & Klausner, supra note 17, at 721 (same), with Choi 
et al., supra note 1, at 36 (suggesting marginal players are key innovators). See Zev J. Eigen, Empirical 
Studies of Contract, 8 Ann. Rev. L. & Soc. Sci. 291, 298–301 (2012) (discussing how contracting parties 
think of contracts); W. Scott Frame & Lawrence J. White, Empirical Studies of Financial Innovation: 
Lots of Talk, Little Action?, 42 J. Econ. Literature 116, 116 (2004) (noting lack of empirical studies 
examining the process of contractual evolution). 
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C. Methodology 
Past studies that explored the process of contractual change relied 
largely on publicly available datasets of contracts.53 In order to identify 
innovations as they arose, these studies carefully tracked precisely when 
certain clauses were added (or deleted) to these agreements over a 
period of many years.54 To a significant extent, these studies utilized 
sovereign debt contracts to analyze the process of innovation because 
these agreements were publicly available and the boilerplate used in 
these agreements was largely standardized.55 Consequently, it was 
possible to identify the exact moment when certain clauses were added 
to (or deleted from) these agreements, and thereafter to draw inferences 
about which actor was most likely responsible for a particular change. 
However well suited these methods may be to the study of sovereign 
debt contracts, they have little to offer to scholars seeking to better 
understand the process of contractual innovation in the context of early-
stage venture capital investments.56 This is particularly true with respect 
to investments made by wealthy individual investors—commonly known 
as angels—who invest in early-stage companies.57 Since angels are so 
widely dispersed and invest relatively small sums of capital in individual 
companies, no comprehensive public dataset of angel investment 
contracts exists.58 Accordingly, a different methodological approach is 
necessary to gain insights into how this particular group of contracts has 
evolved over time. 
Since we lacked access to a reliable dataset of early-stage venture 
finance contracts, we chose to interview a number of individuals who are 
intimately familiar with these contracts: attorneys with a specialty in 
 
 53. The Thomson One Banker database, for example, contains 700 bonds issued by 75 different 
sovereigns between January 1, 1990 and July 1, 2011. Choi et al., supra note 1, at 10–11. Archival 
research has unearthed still more sovereign debt agreements. W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Contracting 
for State Intervention: The Origins of Sovereign Debt Arbitration, 73 Law & Contemp. Probs. 335, 342 
n.37 (2010) (listing various archives). By comparison, there are no comparably comprehensive public 
datasets for venture capital contracts. 
 54. Choi et al., supra note 1, at 10–11. 
 55. See id. 
 56. There is at least one important difference between sovereign debt contracts and venture 
finance contracts. While there is an active secondary market for sovereign debt, the secondary market 
for investments made in early-stage technology companies is virtually nonexistent. The need to 
maintain standard terms in venture contracts, therefore, may be less pressing in these contracts that 
are not actively traded on a secondary market. This difference suggests that innovation may be 
marginally more likely to occur with respect to venture finance contracts than with respect to 
sovereign debt contracts; although such innovation will still be constrained by the various factors 
discussed in Part I.A. 
 57. See generally Andrew Wong, Angel Finance: The Other Venture Capital, in Venture 
Capital: Investment Strategies, Structures, and Policies 71 (Douglas J. Cumming ed., 2010) 
(discussing the methodological challenges in researching angel investors). 
 58. See id. at 76. 
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venture capital. Over the course of several months in late 2013 and early 
2014, we interviewed thirteen lawyers from six different law firms who 
specialize in representing investors and entrepreneurs in connection with 
the financing of early-stage technology companies.59 We then drew upon 
these interviews—along with newspaper accounts, blog postings, and the 
occasional law review article—to construct a narrative of contractual 
innovation specifically as it relates to early-stage venture finance 
agreements. While this narrative is necessarily incomplete, we are 
confident that it is the richest and most comprehensive account that 
currently exists in the academic literature. 
In addition to conducting interviews with attorneys who are familiar 
with venture finance contracts, we also interviewed a number of 
individuals who had themselves proposed innovations to these 
agreements.60 These interviews proved useful in a number of ways. First, 
speaking directly with the innovators enabled us to better understand 
why they proposed certain changes rather than merely documenting the 
fact that change occurred. Second, it allowed us to pull back the curtain 
to better understand how the drafting process—the nitty-gritty work of 
innovation—actually took place. Third, it enabled us to avoid having to 
rely on inferences derived from contract datasets over time and, instead, 
to hear the story of contractual innovation directly from those 
responsible for the innovation.61 
 
 59. We interviewed thirteen attorneys based in Silicon Valley, Denver, and New York City in late 
2013 and early 2014. Three interviews were conducted in person in New York City in October, 
November, and December 2013. Six interviews were conducted over the phone. The remaining four 
interviews took place over e-mail, as the interviewees responded in writing to written questions and 
follow-up questions. We arranged the interviews by asking friends and colleagues to make 
introductions on our behalf. Accordingly, the responses that we received may reflect a bias stemming 
from this non-random sample. The answers that we received were, however, consistent with 
observations and sentiments voiced by bloggers on websites that regularly discuss venture finance 
issues. A “snowball sample” approach was used to identify potential interviewees. See Patrick 
Biernacki & Dan Waldorf, Snowball Sampling: Problems and Techniques of Chain Referral Sampling, 
10 Soc. Methods & Res. 141, 141 (1981) (“Snowball . . . sampling is a method that . . . yields a study 
sample through referrals made among people who share or know of others who possess some 
characteristics that are of research interest. The method is well suited for a number of research 
purposes and is particularly applicable when the focus of study is on a sensitive issue, possibly 
concerning a relatively private matter, and thus requires the knowledge of insiders to locate people for 
study.”); see also Charles Kadushin, Power, Influence and Social Circles: A New Methodology for 
Studying Opinion Makers, 33 Am. Soc. Rev. 685, 694–97 (1968) (discussing the strengths and 
weaknesses of snowball sampling). Previous studies of contractual innovation have also relied upon 
the snowball sampling method. See, e.g., Mark Weidemaier, Robert Scott & Mitu Gulati, Origin 
Myths, Contracts, and the Hunt for Pari Passu, 38 Law & Soc. Inquiry 72, 76 n.1 (2013). 
 60. Each of these innovators is included in the list of thirteen attorneys discussed above. See 
supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
 61. This approach is thus distinguishable from one that first identifies the contractual change and 
then seeks to determine the individuals responsible for the change inferentially by looking to which 
firm or underwriter represented the contract user. 
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There are, to be sure, drawbacks with any methodological approach 
that relies primarily on interviews. Human memory is fallible. There is 
the possibility of self-serving accounts that overstate the role of the 
interviewee—or the interviewee’s employer—in pioneering particular 
innovations. Further, our non-random choice of interview subjects may 
have led us to overemphasize certain aspects of the story. Nevertheless, 
we believe that the methods utilized in researching this Article are 
appropriate given the unique access challenges posed by this particular 
body of contracts. We also derive confidence from the fact that the 
narrative set forth in this Article is generally consistent with other partial 
accounts of the changes that have swept the market for venture funding 
over the past several years. 
II.  Venture Finance Contracts Pre-Cloud 
In 1981, the Practicing Law Institute published a book entitled The 
Legal Aspects of Venture Capital Investing.62 This book listed a number 
of different types of securities that were widely used in venture finance, 
including (1) common stock, (2) convertible preferred stock, and (3) 
convertible notes or debentures.63 This Part provides an overview of the 
ways in which each of these instruments was most commonly utilized in 
venture finance between 1981 and 2005. This inquiry both sets the stage 
for the discussion to follow and serves to establish a baseline against 
which to evaluate subsequent contractual innovations. 
A. Friends, Family, and Angels: Common Stock 
Historically, in order to finance a new venture, entrepreneurs would 
use their own funds (often called “bootstrapping”) to test, as cheaply as 
possible, whether a market existed for their concept.64 Those who were 
fortunate enough to have friends and family who could help finance the 
fledgling company could obtain capital from them.65 Entrepreneurs who 
 
 62. See generally Practising Law Institute, The Legal Aspects of Venture Capital Investing 
1981, at 291 (1981). 
 63. Nahum L. Gordon, The Different Types of Securities Issued in a Venture Capital 
Investment—Convertibles, Warrants; Also the Problem of Equitable Subordination (and Usury), in 
The Legal Aspects of Venture Capital Investing, supra note 62, at 294. 
 64. See Andrew Metrick & Ayako Yasuda, Venture Capital and the Finance of Innovation 15 
(2d ed. 2011) (discussing stages of investment finance in venture capital); Richard A. Mann et al., Starting 
from Scratch: A Lawyer’s Guide to Representing a Start-Up Company, 56 Ark. L. Rev. 773, 821–22 
(2004) (discussing bootstrapping methods); Jeffrey E. Sohl, The U.S. Angel and Venture Capital Market: 
Recent Trends and Developments, 6 J. Private Equity 7, 13 (2003) (“At the inception, or pre-seed stage, 
the venture is owner/investor-financed through a variety of bootstrapping methods.”). 
 65. See David Nour, The Entrepreneur’s Guide to Raising Capital 44 (2009) (discussing friends 
and family as sources of capital); Stephen F. Reed & Esther S. Barron, Entrepreneurship Law: Cases 
and Materials 153 (2013) (discussing caveats when using friends and family as sources of capital). 
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were able to gain access to “angel” investors—wealthy individuals who 
invest in start-up companies—could raise still more capital.66 
Although there was considerable variation in sophistication between 
and among friends, family, and angel investors, these early-stage 
investors would usually receive common stock when they invested in a 
new company.67 Among other rights, common stockholders have the 
right to vote in director elections, the right to receive dividends when 
declared, and the right to approve certain fundamental changes to the 
corporate structure.68 Common stockholders are also owed fiduciary 
duties by corporate officers and directors.69 
The primary virtue of common stock is its simplicity. As a tool for 
providing significant seed capital to early-stage technology companies, 
however, it exhibits several drawbacks. Successful companies are rare in 
the start-up world. For every “home run,” a great many more companies 
are eventually disposed of in a fire sale, or worse, shuttered and 
liquidated.70 If and when liquidation occurs, the common stockholder 
will be subordinated to all other classes of securities and other creditors 
in liquidation, and share ratably with the founders of the company (who 
likely received their common stock without making a financial 
investment in the company).71 Given this reality, the fact that individuals 
who invest in these companies would accept common stock, rather than a 
different security that offers more legal and economic protections on the 
downside, is curious. 
 
 66. Mann, supra note 64, at 823. 
 67. William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, A Theory of Preferred Stock, 161 U. Pa. L. Rev. 
1815, 1882 (2013) (“Significantly, angels tend to take common stock stakes, foregoing board seats, 
negative covenants, vetoes, and exit rights.”); Jesse M. Fried & Mira Ganor, Agency Costs of Venture 
Capitalist Control in Startups, 81 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 967, 1009 (2006) (“[A]ngels frequently invest through 
common equity.”); Stephen G. Morrissette, A Profile of Angel Investors, 10 J. Private Equity 52, 59 
(2007) (“Unlike the more sophisticated deal terms and complex securities used by venture capitalists, 
angels mostly make simple common stock investments . . . .”); John L. Orcutt, Improving the 
Efficiency of the Angel Finance Market: A Proposal to Expand the Intermediary Role of Finders in 
the Private Capital Raising Setting, 37 Ariz. St. L.J. 861, 895 (2005) (“Many angels are content to 
receive common stock, rather than convertible preferred stock and its added protections against 
agency problems.”). Cf. Abraham J.B. Cable, Fending for Themselves: Why Securities Regulations 
Should Encourage Angel Groups, 13 U. Pa. J. Bus. L. 107, 127 (2010) (“It is often stated that angel 
investors are more likely to invest in common than preferred stock. Recent studies, however, suggest 
that this perception is no longer accurate (if it ever was).”). 
 68. Gordon, supra note 63, at 294–97. 
 69. James D. Cox & Thomas Lee Hazen, Treatise on the Law of Corporations § 10:9 (3d ed. 2010). 
 70. Ronald J. Gilson & David M. Schizer, Understanding Venture Capital Structure: A Tax 
Explanation for Convertible Preferred Stock, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 874, 884 (2003) (“[T]he stereotypical 
risky venture-backed firm is either a ‘home run’ or a total failure.”). 
 71. Id. at 883–84. 
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One possible explanation for these investors’ historical willingness 
to accept common stock is their relative lack of sophistication.72 Another 
is the possibility that the size of the investment was relatively small and 
amounted to an insignificant portion of the investor’s overall portfolio.73 
Still another possible explanation, proffered by Darian Ibrahim, is that 
these investors are able to utilize informal, non-contractual sanctioning 
regimes to discipline wayward entrepreneurs, thereby making it 
unnecessary for them to negotiate for formal contractual protections in 
connection with their investment.74 Ibrahim also argues that many of 
these investors derive psychic, non-financial benefits from investing and 
do not wish to interject a complex set of contractual protections into the 
investment relationship.75 Finally, Ibrahim observes that the relatively 
low legal fees associated with investing in common stock make it an 
attractive option when the amount of money at stake is relatively small.76 
Whatever the precise explanation for the widespread use of 
common stock to finance early-stage companies, sophisticated investors 
long ago began to seek alternative investment structures that offered 
more in the way of contractual protections.77 While some chose to 
structure their investment in the form of convertible notes, our 
interviews suggested that this practice was relatively infrequent prior to 
approximately 2005.78 It was far more common, we were told, for 
 
 72. Fried & Ganor, supra note 67, at 1009 (“Because angels invest less than VCs and are 
generally less sophisticated, their financing agreements are much more informal. Unlike VCs, angels 
generally do not acquire control rights and board positions. Most importantly, angels frequently invest 
through common equity.”). 
 73. See id. (“The amounts invested in a firm by an individual angel investor (as opposed to the 
total amount of angel financing) is likely to be much smaller than the amounts invested by individual 
VC firms.”). 
 74. See Darian M. Ibrahim, The (Not So) Puzzling Behavior of Angel Investors, 61 Vand. L. 
Rev. 1405, 1441–42 (2008). 
 75. See id. 
 76. Id. at 1443–45. 
 77. Josh Lerner et al., Venture Capital and Private Equity 288 (3d ed. 2005) (“Typically, 
venture capitalists do not buy common stock.”). 
 78. Although the primary purpose of the convertible note in venture finance prior to 2005 was as 
a “bridge” between one round of venture financing and the next, as discussed in Part II.C, non-
institutional investors would occasionally utilize versions of these same notes to fund a company at its 
earliest stages. In other words, a convertible note was sometimes used as a substitute for common 
stock when friends, family, and angels invested in early-stage companies. We identified at least two 
instances in which convertible notes were used to finance early-stage technology companies in the 
1970s and 1980s. See, e.g., Daniel C. Cox, Comment, Lawsuit Syndication: An Investment Opportunity 
in Legal Grievances, 35 St. Louis U. L.J. 153, 157 (1990) (discussing use of a convertible note to fund a 
company in the 1970s); Jill Andresky Fraser, Anatomy of a Financing: The Benefits of Convertible 
Debt, Inc. Magazine (Feb. 1, 1995), http://www.inc.com/magazine/19950201/2159.html (discussing use 
of a convertible note to fund a company in the 1980s). We also identified several sources suggesting 
that this practice continued into the 1990s and 2000s. See Jeffrey M. Leavitt, Burned Angels: The 
Coming Wave of Minority Shareholder Oppression Claims in Venture Capital Start-up Companies, 
6 N.C. J. L. & Tech. 223, 257 (2005) (“Some very seasoned angels . . . will invest in a convertible note 
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sophisticated investors—particularly those with substantial amounts of 
capital to invest—to utilize convertible preferred stock. 
B. Venture Capitalists: Convertible Preferred Stock 
Once a new technology venture’s initial stores of capital were 
exhausted, the founders would need to raise a more substantial round of 
capital in order to expand the scale of the business. The amount of 
money required for this next phase of growth was (and remains) more 
than could usually be raised by friends, family, and angel investors, but 
the companies typically did not have sufficient assets or cash flow to 
secure a bank loan on commercially attractive terms (if at all).79 
Additionally, it was often the case that founders needed other non-
financial resources to successfully scale the business. For example, 
founders who were undertaking their first venture needed ongoing 
advice and counsel related to growing a business and access to industry 
contacts, neither of which would typically be provided by commercial 
lenders.80 Enter the institutional venture capitalist (“VC”).81 The 
partners of a VC firm would have extensive experience advising founders 
of growing companies on how to build their businesses and ultimately 
achieve a profitable exit for the founder and the VC funds, either 
 
with principal and interest convertible into the company’s subsequent preferred equity round.”); MIT 
Entrepreneurship Ctr., Venture Support Systems Project: Angel Investors 38 (2000) (“Some high 
tech angels use convertible debt to avoid the battle over valuation with the entrepreneur.”). A number 
of our interviewees confirmed that convertible notes were sometimes used to provide seed funding 
prior to the advent of the cloud computing era. See, e.g., E-mail from Attorney, Silicon Valley Law 
Firm I, to John Coyle (Jan. 15, 2014, 6:05 PM) (on file with John Coyle) (“[W]e were doing convertible 
notes for seed round financings in 1997. The difference was that in those days there wasn’t an 
especially robust angel market.”); E-mail from In-House Counsel, Silicon Valley Venture Capital 
Fund, to John Coyle (Jan. 20, 2014, 6:26 PM) (on file with John Coyle) (stating that convertible notes 
were used for seed funding in 1999 but acknowledging that this was not the “standard” practice at the 
time). All of our interviewees agreed that the practice of using convertible notes to fund seed rounds 
was uncommon in the years prior to the technological advances discussed in Part III. This view is 
generally consistent with the prevailing academic wisdom that angel investors generally structured 
their investments in the form of common stock. See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 67, at 1882. 
Accordingly, we defer an extended analysis of the use of convertible notes for this purpose to Part IV. 
 79. There were a small number of market actors willing to extend “venture debt” to start-up 
companies even if they had not participated in the initial round of financing. See Lerner, supra note 
77, at 112–20 (3d ed. 2005) (discussing venture debt). In these instances, a lender would extend loans 
to start-up companies in exchange for warrant coverage and a promise to repay the loan with interest 
upon maturity. See Darian M. Ibrahim, Debt as Venture Capital, 2010 Ill. L. Rev. 1169, 1176–80 
(discussing venture debt business model). 
 80. See Ola Bengtsson & Frederick Wang, What Matters in Venture Capital? Evidence from 
Entrepreneurs’ Stated Preferences, 39 Fin. Mgmt 1367, 1397 (2010) (“[E]ntrepreneurs have a more 
favorable view of VCs that have valuable contacts, provide operational help, assist with recruiting new 
employees, facilitate in raising additional capital, and, to a lesser extent, assist the company at exit.”). 
 81. See Ibrahim, supra note 74, at 1422 (“These findings track the conventional wisdom that 
angels provide early-stage funding to grow the start-up for the first year or so, after which venture 
capitalists take over.”). 
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through a sale of the company to a larger acquirer or through an initial 
public offering of the company’s stock.82 They would also have had 
sufficiently “deep pockets” to support the company financially as it grew 
and required additional investment. 
VC investors typically staged the financing of a new company over 
several “rounds” of investment, thereby giving the investors leverage 
even after the initial investment was made.83 The first round in which an 
institutional VC invested in a company was commonly known as the 
“Series A” round—so named on account of the convention that VC 
funds would purchase Series A Convertible Preferred Stock of the 
company.84 This series of convertible preferred stock and other 
investment contracts associated with the Series A round of financing 
contained a standard panoply of rights designed to protect the VC 
investors’ interests, as they would only be purchasing a minority, non-
controlling stake in the company at this stage (typically twenty to thirty-
five percent). The holders of Series A Preferred Stock would, for 
example, typically be entitled to a preferred dividend and a liquidation 
preference, which would give them priority over the common 
stockholders in respect of any distributions of cash until the company 
had returned the investors’ initial investment plus any accrued but 
unpaid dividends.85 The preferred stock would be convertible to common 
stock on a 1:1 basis.86 The lead VC fund and other larger investors would 
also typically receive contractual preemptive rights to subscribe for 
additional shares in any future financing round, if they wished to 
maintain their ownership percentages of the company.87 The consent of 
Series A stockholders would be required for the company to undertake 
certain actions, such as authorizing or issuing additional stock, incurring 
indebtedness, agreeing to undergo a change in control or other 
 
 82. Elizabeth Pollman, Information Issues on Wall Street 2.0, 161 U. Pa. L. Rev. 179, 184 (2012) 
(“The goal is for the start-up companies to achieve successful ‘exits’ that make a significant return on 
investment for the venture capital fund . . . . The primary exit mechanisms for start-ups are going 
public and being acquired in a merger transaction . . . .”). 
 83. John F. Coyle & Gregg D. Polsky, Acqui-hiring, 63 Duke L.J. 281, 288 (2013). 
 84. Id. 
 85. Some scholars have argued that venture capitalists structure their investment in the form of 
preferred stock not for the priority that preferred stock enjoys in liquidation, but for the tax benefits 
conferred by the use of such stock. See Gilson & Schizer, supra note 70, at 902–04. Having a priority in 
liquidation, so the argument goes, is not particularly valuable when the company is worthless. 
 86. This ratio would typically be adjusted in the investors’ favor if the company subsequently sold 
preferred stock for less than the Series A per share purchase price, giving the Series A investors anti-
dilution protection in the event that they paid more for their shares than a future investor. The ratio 
would also be adjusted in the event of stock splits or combinations. Gregg D. Polsky & Brant J. 
Hellwig, Examining the Tax Advantage of Founders’ Stock, 97 Iowa L. Rev. 1085, 1095–96 (2012); 
Michael A. Woronoff & Jonathan A. Rosen, Effective vs. Nominal Valuations in Venture Capital 
Investing, 2 N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 199, 204 n.27 (2005).  
 87. See Ibrahim, supra note 74, at 1413–15. 
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liquidation of the company, paying dividends, or redeeming outstanding 
shares of stock.88 Finally, to ensure proper governance and protect the 
interests of the investors, a partner from the lead VC firm would usually 
demand a seat on the board of directors.89 
The VC funds would invest an amount that was intended to give 
their new portfolio company sufficient capital to operate (“runway,” in 
the industry’s parlance) for one year to eighteen months before it would 
need additional investment.90 The goal was for the company to achieve 
certain milestones during that period (based on metrics such as revenue, 
users, eyeballs, mouse clicks, etc.) that would attract investment from 
new VC funds at a substantially higher valuation.91 For successful 
companies, this process would continue over a number of years, with the 
company raising additional capital at increasingly higher valuations by 
selling shares of new series of preferred stock (Series B, Series C, Series 
D, and so on) to new investors, usually with their existing investors 
participating in such subsequent rounds to maintain their pro rata 
ownership. 
C. The Stopgap Investor: Convertible Notes and Bridge Loans 
Historically, the primary purpose of the convertible note in venture 
finance was to serve as a “bridge” between one round of venture 
financing and the next. A convertible note, as the name suggests, is a 
debt instrument that may be converted into equity.92 The convertible 
note pays interest, has a formal maturity date, gives the holder priority 
over equity holders, and puts the holder on an equal footing with other 
unsecured debt holders and trade creditors in liquidation.93 In contrast to 
straight debt, however, convertible notes may be converted into common 
stock or preferred stock, thereby giving the holder a chance to 
 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 1414–15. 
 90. Interview with Attorney, New York Law Firm II (Nov. 20, 2013). 
 91. Id. 
 92. These instruments have a long history outside of venture capital. See A. A. Berle, Jr., 
Convertible Bonds and Stock Purchase Warrants, 36 Yale L.J. 649, 649 (1927) (“Convertible bonds 
and notes have been familiar documents on the stock exchanges for a number of years.”); William A. 
Klein, The Convertible Bond: A Peculiar Package, 123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 547, 547 (1975) (“[C]onvertible 
bonds have been widely used for many years . . . .”); see also Arthur Stone Dewing, The Financial 
Policy of Corporations 269–71 (5th ed. 1953) (discussing use of convertible bonds by various 
companies in historical context). Much of the literature on convertible debt is focused on its issuance 
by public companies. See generally William W. Bratton, Jr., The Economics and Jurisprudence of 
Convertible Bonds, 1984 Wis. L. Rev. 667; Alexander J. Triantis & George G. Triantis, Conversion 
Rights and the Design of Financial Contracts, 72 Wash. U. L. Q. 1231 (1994). 
 93. See Jesse H. Choper et al., Cases and Materials on Corporations 201 (7th ed. 2008). 
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participate in the upside if a company ultimately achieves a successful 
exit.94 
In the start-up context, convertible debt was historically used by the 
existing investors of a company in two bridge-like situations: (1) if the 
investors were confident that the company would be able to achieve an 
important milestone if only it had enough capital to provide a few 
additional months of runway, and that achieving that milestone, in turn, 
would then enable the company to raise capital from new outside 
investors; or (2) the investors and the founders were trying to sell a 
struggling company and it needed additional funds to continue operating 
while they found a buyer and negotiated the sale of the business.95 We 
refer to the convertible debt instruments used in these two situations as 
“bridge notes.” When we later explore the use of convertible debt as the 
first round of financing for a new venture, we will refer to those 
instruments as “seed notes.” 
Although the terms of a bridge note could vary greatly depending 
on a number of circumstances, they generally contained a number of 
standard terms.96 For instance, since the bridge notes were debt 
instruments, they would bear interest, and the principal and interest 
would become due and payable upon demand at maturity if the notes 
were not converted to equity prior to that time.97 These notes would 
sometimes be secured if the company had assets that made a security 
interest worth the time and expense of perfection.98 
 
 94. See George G. Triantis, Financial Contract Design in the World of Venture Capital, 68 U. 
Chi. L. Rev. 305, 317 (2001) (“Conventional convertible debt gives the security holder the option to 
trade its debt for common stock in the issuer. The instrument defines the time during which the option 
may be exercised and also often grants to the issuer the right to call the debt in order to induce the 
convertible debtholder to convert.”); Bratton, supra note 92, at 673 (“The issuer incorporating a 
conversion privilege into its bonds grants a future claim on its equity. For investors, this future claim 
gives convertible bonds the advantage of combining desirable features of straight bonds, such as fixed 
income payments and principal repayment, with the upside potential of common stock.”). 
 95. See Yoichiro Taku, What Is Convertible Equity (or a Convertible Security)?, Startup 
Company Law. (Aug. 31, 2012), http://www.startupcompanylawyer.com/category/convertible-note-
bridge-financing (“Originally, the concept of convertible debt was part of the VC playbook in order to 
‘bridge’ companies that needed financing in between round of equity financingsuch as between 
Series A and Series Bin order to get to the next milestone to raise financing or sell the company.”). 
 96. The terms may vary depending upon (1) whether the investment was a bridge to another 
equity financing or a sale, (2) the company’s chances of reaching either of those events, (3) whether all 
of the company’s existing investors were willing to continue supporting the company and (4) the 
company’s existing capital structure. Interview with Attorney, New York Law Firm I (Dec. 3, 2013). 
 97. See Coyle & Polsky, supra note 83, at 290 (“In the event the startup is liquidated before a 
note is converted, the noteholder traditionally was entitled to a return of his investment plus accrued 
interest.”); George W. Dent, Jr., The Role of Convertible Securities in Corporate Finance, 21 J. Corp. 
L. 241, 243–44 (1996) (“Convertibles are often callablethe issuer may redeem them during a state 
period at a stated price, which is usually the issue price, plus any accrued, unpaid interest or dividends, 
plus a call premium.”). 
 98. See David J. Kendall, Venture Capital Lending: Usury and Fiduciary Duty Concerns, 
33 Colo. Law. 49, 52 (2004) (“A company may agree to grant a security interest in all or a portion of 
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The conversion feature of the bridge notes envisaged several 
possible outcomes. If the company raised a new round of equity 
financing from outside investors, the noteholders would be able to 
convert their notes into shares of the new series of preferred stock to be 
sold in that subsequent financing.99 Since an interest rate high enough to 
truly provide adequate compensation to the noteholders for the risk of 
default in these circumstances would likely have been viewed as 
usurious, noteholders instead received warrant coverage (which might 
range from twenty percent to over fifty percent of the principal amount 
of the notes for companies in dire straits).100 Warrant coverage was a 
standard feature of straight bank debt for VC-backed companies and was 
typically used in the bridge note context, as well to provide additional 
upside for the noteholders should the bridge loan enable the company to 
reach another equity financing or sale.101 Since many of these bridge 
notes were intended to help the company reach an exit event, there were 
special provisions regarding the treatment of the bridge notes upon a 
change in control or IPO.102 In such situations, the agreements would 
often provide for the noteholders to receive two or three times the 
principal amount of their notes, plus interest, upon consummation of an 
exit.103 
Despite its debt-like features, such as interest rates, maturity dates, 
and security interests,104 bridge notes could also be thought of as a 
deferred equity investment because the bridge investors’ expectations 
were not to have the principal repaid with interest, but to receive equity 
at some future date.105 Unlike more traditional debt instruments, bridge 
notes did not contain negative or affirmative covenants, had very light 
 
its assets to secure a bridge loan.”). But see Antone Johnson, Knowledge Is Power: Convertible Note 
Financing Terms, Part I, Gust (Sept. 29, 2011), http://gust.com/blog/2011/09/29/convertible-note-
financing-terms-1 (“[T]he note is usually not secured by any kind of collateral [because] [i]nvestor and 
entrepreneur alike are betting on success, in which case the note will convert to equity.”). 
 99. See Christopher K. Aidun & Ernest Ceberio, Current Trends in Venture Capital Financing: 
2002, 7 Cyberspace Law. 2, 4 (2002) (“Sometimes, when bridge investors believe the next capital event 
may be a sale of the Company, the bridge notes are also made convertible, at the option of the holders, 
in to an existing series of preferred stock.”). 
 100. Id. (“Warrants are always issued with bridge notes.”). 
 101. See Ibrahim, supra note 79, at 1176–80 (discussing phenomenon of venture debt). 
 102. Interview with Attorney, New York Law Firm II, supra note 90. 
 103. Id. 
 104. See, e.g., Kendall, supra note 98, 50–52 (outlining the common terms and conditions of VC 
bridge loans, including term of the loan, interest rate, liquidation preference, convertibility, anti-
dilution protections, warrant coverage, and security). 
 105. See, e.g., Charles R.P. Pouncy, Contemporary Financial Innovation: Orthodoxy and 
Alternatives, 51 SMU L. Rev. 505, 522 n.101 (1998) (“If preferred shares can be viewed as debt-like 
equity, then convertible bonds can be seen as equity-like debt. Generally, the holder [of] a convertible 
bond may, at her option, exchange it for a predetermined amount of common stock.”); Aidun & 
Ceberio, supra note 99, at 4 (“Bridge notes generally carry . . . an opportunity to convert to equity.”). 
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events of default, and had minimal representations and warranties.106 
The notes also did not require any periodic payments, since these 
businesses were not profitable and were fully expected to use all of the 
cash raised from the bridge notes on ongoing operations rather than on 
servicing interest payments.107 
If bridge notes were really more appropriately considered deferred 
equity, why didn’t these firms just issue more equity instead? After all, 
the liquidation preference and dividends of preferred stock could easily 
be made the economic equivalent of the principal and interest of a bridge 
note. Since most of the companies that raised capital through bridge 
notes were struggling, however, structuring the investment as debt 
provided some additional downside protection for the investors in the 
event that the company failed and had to be sold at a loss or liquidated. 
As debt, the bridge notes would have priority over all of the preferred 
and common stock in liquidation, which would ensure that the last 
money in would be the first money out.108 This could become particularly 
important if only some of the investors were continuing to support the 
company through the bridge investment, as the participating investors 
may have been unwilling to purchase preferred stock that would have 
shared priority with all of the previous preferred shareholders (even 
investors who refused to participate in the bridge). The priority of debt 
in a liquidation, along with the relative simplicity of bridge notes (and 
the resulting ease and speed of execution), thus led investors to structure 
these investments as debt instead of equity. 
D. Summary 
Venture finance, as it was practiced in Silicon Valley and elsewhere 
at the turn of the last century, operated within a fairly stable legal 
framework. In a company’s early days, friends, family, and angel 
investors would contribute relatively small amounts of capital to the 
venture in exchange for common stock. As the company grew, its 
founders would raise additional capital from VCs by issuing convertible 
preferred stock. In the event that future rounds of financing were 
required, the company would sometimes issue convertible notes to its 
 
 106. See Dent, supra note 97, at 247 (“If convertibles were employed when an issuer is considered 
likely to undertake undue risk, covenants would be especially stringent in convertible financings. In 
practice, however, the opposite is truecovenants tend to be tighter for straight debt.”). 
 107. See Triantis, supra note 94, at 312 (“Start-up firms often have negative earnings or cash flows 
in their early stages, and therefore the security typically does not provide for mandatory periodic 
payments of either interest or dividends.”). 
 108. See Kendall, supra note 98, at 50 (explaining that bridge financing provides the economic and 
legal benefit of giving creditors priority over all equity holders, including preferred equity holders and 
that in the event of liquidation, a bridge loan allows a VC investor to be higher in the capital 
structure). 
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existing investors in order to obtain enough capital to sustain it until the 
next preferred stock round of financing or a sale. Beginning in 
approximately 2005, however, this orderly world was disrupted by a 
number of economic and technological changes. These changes are 
detailed in the next Part. 
III.  Cloud Computing and the Changing Face of  
Technology Start-ups 
Over the past decade, the costs of launching a new technology start-
up have fallen precipitously.109 At the same time, new technologies have 
given these start-ups the ability to rapidly scale their operations.110 These 
changes, in turn, have had a dramatic impact on the way that technology 
companies are launched and financed. This Part chronicles these changes 
and explains how they set the stage for a number of contractual 
innovations in the world of venture finance. 
A. The Falling Costs of Launching a Start-up 
In order to found and build a serious software company circa 1999, 
serious money was required. A new company had to pay for office space, 
computers, servers, and software, and none of these items came cheap. 
The conventional wisdom held that a start-up had to raise at least three 
to five million dollars just to determine whether an idea was viable.111 
Since this much money was typically more than could be raised from 
friends, family, and even most angel investors, the support of a VC was 
essential if a company was to survive past its infancy. 
Beginning in roughly 2005, however, the costs of launching a new 
software company began to fall.112 One key reason for this decline was 
the rise of cloud computing.113 With the advent of the cloud, it was no 
 
 109. George Deeb, The Top 4 Reasons VCs Bias Technology Startups, Forbes (Oct. 23, 2013, 
9:20 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/georgedeeb/2013/10/23/the-top-4-reasons-vcs-bias-technology-
startups (“The cost of building a technology startup has dramatically reduced over the last decade. No 
longer do you need to pay for hardware, or code commonly-used tools, or pay for big support teams. 
Websites today are hosted in the cloud and use open source software, taking the cost of the build-out 
down from the millions a decade ago to the hundreds of thousands today.”). 
 110. Id. 
 111. See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, Software and Patent Scope: A Report from the Middle Innings, 
85 Tex. L. Rev. 1627, 1639 (2007) (showing that VCs invested $2.697 million on average in first-time 
start-up financings in 1999). 
 112. See Darian M. Ibrahim, Should Angel-Backed Start-Ups Reject Venture Capital?, 2 Mich. J. 
Private Equity & Venture Capital L. 251, 256–57 (2013). 
 113. See Coyle & Polsky, supra note 83, at 292; see also William Jeremy Robinson, Note, Free at 
What Cost?: Cloud Computing Privacy Under the Stored Communications Act, 98 Geo. L.J. 1195, 1199 
(2010) (“[Cloud computing is] the ability to run applications and store data on a service provider’s 
computers over the Internet, rather than on a person’s desktop computer.”). Cloud computing overcomes 
many of the inefficiencies of a dispersed computing model by eliminating the cost of purchasing 
processing power and storage capacity, the cost of data protection, and the cost of equipment failure. Id. 
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longer necessary for young Internet companies to purchase and maintain 
expensive servers to provide their own web hosting.114 Cloud computing 
also made it possible for start-ups to rely on cloud-based software to 
manage various functions in a more cost-efficient way. Such software was 
frequently used, for example, by start-ups to handle their accounting, to 
manage their customer relationships, and to store their data.115 In 
addition, new companies were able to make use of more widely available 
open-source software. New companies could, for example, obtain the use 
of high-quality open-source software that enabled to them handle tasks, 
such as graphics editing, online payment, and e-mail marketing, at 
literally no cost to the company.116 The upshot of these and other 
changes was that many technology start-ups could operate on a relative 
shoestring for much longer than was previously the case.117 
Even as the costs of launching a start-up declined, the ability of such 
companies to rapidly achieve significant scale at comparatively little cost 
was enhanced. The increasing penetration of high-speed Internet access 
via computers, smart phones, tablets, and other mobile devices meant 
that new software products could find a market with only minimal 
marketing and distribution costs.118 This ability to scale up more easily 
was also attributable in significant part to the growing popularity of 
 
at 1200–01. The advent of cloud computing has also shifted development from the “Software as a Service” 
model to the “Platform as a Service” model where providers open their systems to third-party developers 
who create applications on the provider’s platform. Id. at 1203. For further information on cloud 
computing, see James Manyika et al., McKinsey Global Inst., Disruptive Technologies: Advances 
that Will Transform Life, Business, and the Global Economy 6 (2013), available at 
http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/business_technology/disruptive_technologies. 
 114. See Tim Beyers, Investors Look to Fund Capital-Light Businesses, Entrepreneur (Aug. 12, 2010), 
http://www.entrepreneur.com/article/217209; Gene Marks, Do You Replace Your Server or Go to the 
Cloud? The Answer May Surprise You, Forbes (Apr. 29, 2013, 11:17 AM), http://www.forbes.com/ 
sites/quickerbettertech/2013/04/29/do-you-replace-your-server-or-go-to-the-cloud-the-answer-may-surprise-
you (“There’s no question that if you’re a startup or a very small company or a company that is virtual or 
whose employees are distributed around the world, a cloud based environment is the way to go.”); Hafizah 
Osman, SMBs That Embrace Cloud Enjoy More Revenue: MYOB, ARN (Apr. 24, 2013, 3:27 PM), 
http://www.arnnet.com.au/article/459981/smbs_embrace_cloud_enjoy_more_revenue_myob. 
 115. Joe McKendrick, How Cloud Computing is Fueling the Next Startup Boom, Forbes (Nov. 1, 
2011, 6:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/joemckendrick/2011/11/01/cloud-computing-is-fuel-for-
the-next-entrepreneurial-boom. 
 116. Jonathan Stoddard, Open Source Software Helps the Lean Startup, KTG Inc., 
https://web.archive.org/web/20130529140517/http://www.ktgdenver.com/content/open-source-software-
helps-lean-startup (last visited Dec. 14, 2014).  
 117. See McKendrick, supra note 115 (“As Chris Sacca, a 280 North investor and former Google 
Inc. executive, put it: ‘The biggest line item in these companies now is rent and food . . . A decade ago, 
I don’t think you could write a line of code for less than $1 million.’”). 
 118. See OECD Broadband Portal, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/sti/broadband/ 
oecdbroadbandportal.htm (last updated July 22, 2014) (providing tables that show country-by-country 
percentage increases of broadband penetration per 100 inhabitants and historical penetration rates of 
G7 countries); Tom Cheshire, In Depth: How Rovio Made Angry Birds a Winner (and What’s Next), 
Wired (Mar. 7, 2011), http://www.wired.co.uk/magazine/archive/2011/04/features/how-rovio-made-
angry-birds-a-winner (discussing the low costs of marketing and distributing the Angry Birds app). 
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social media networks.119 These networks enabled Internet trends and 
brands to grow virally, which in turn made it possible for new technology 
products to spread rapidly across the United States and around the 
world.120 While consumer Internet and social media companies 
benefitted the most from the changes, business-to-business and software-
as-a-service models have also taken advantage of opportunities that 
these changes have wrought.121 
In summary, a confluence of developments in technology—
including cloud-based servers, cloud-based software, and open-source 
code—substantially reduced the costs of launching a technology-based 
start-up, beginning in approximately 2005. At the same time, a number of 
other factors—including the improved accessibility of high-speed 
Internet and the increased popularity of social media—enabled these 
same companies to rapidly achieve significant scale. 
B. The Impact on Venture Finance 
Given the breadth and scope of the changes discussed above, it 
should come as little surprise that they had a marked impact on the ways 
that start-up technology companies are financed. To illustrate this point, 
assume that the founder of a new software company in 2002 would have 
bootstrapped the business with $50,000 to $100,000 of his own money, or 
perhaps up to $250,000 with money from friends, family, and angel 
 
 119. As of January 2014, seventy-four percent of adults use social networking sites. See Social 
Networking Fact Sheet, Pew Research Internet Project, http://pewinternet.org/fact-sheets/social-
networking-fact-sheet (last visited Dec. 14, 2014); see also Jeremy Gelms, High-Tech Harassment: 
Employer Liability Under Title VII for Employee Social Media Misconduct, 87 Wash. L. Rev. 249, 266 
(2012) (“The most popular social networking site, Facebook, has over 800 million users worldwide. These 
users include roughly sixty percent of the American Internet population.”); Sarah Tran, Cyber-
Republicanism, 55 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 383, 413 (2013) (“Whereas a 2011 survey indicated 43 percent 
of American adults had a Facebook page, a 2012 survey reports that a whopping 56 percent of the 
adult population now have a page and that over one-third of its users access Facebook at least once a 
day.”). 
 120. See Deeb, supra note 109. 
 121. See Philippe Botteri et al., Bessemer Venture Partners, Bessemer’s Top 10 Laws of 
Cloud Computing and SaaS 3 (2010), available at http://www.bvp.com/sites/default/files/ 
bvps_10_laws_of_cloud_saas_winter_2010_release.pdf (“One of the clear benefits of the Cloud 
Computing hype is that many very large companies are collectively investing billions of dollars in 
Cloud infrastructure and are now tripping over themselves to offer your business Cloud infrastructure 
at ridiculously low prices.”). In addition to decreasing infrastructure cost, cloud computing also 
enables Software-as-a-Service (“SAAS”) businesses to aggregate detailed usage statistics of its 
customers at low cost. Id. at 10. Others have outlined the benefits of business-to-business (“B2B”) 
cloud integration. Cindy Frei, How Cloud Computing Expands B2B Opportunities, MarketResearch 
(Mar. 14, 2013, 5:45 PM), http://blog.marketresearch.com/blog-home-page/bid/217824/How-Cloud-
Computing-Expands-B2B-Opportunities-MarketResearch-com (“For B2B companies especially, the 
benefits of transitioning older systems to the cloud are obvious, starting with cost reduction in 
operations and IT.”); Josh Hardy, For Leading Global Business, the Future of B2B Integration Is in 
the Cloud, Smarter Commerce (Oct. 28, 2013), http://www.smartercommerceblog.com/articles/2013/ 
10/28/for-leading-global-businesses-the-future-of-b2b-integration-is-in-the-cloud. 
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investors in exchange for shares of common stock. After burning through 
that money over several months to prove the concept of the business on 
a small scale, the founder would likely have sold Series A stock to a VC 
fund to raise an additional $3 million to $5 million, giving up perhaps a 
third of the company (implying a valuation of the company of $6 million 
to $10 million prior to the investment, the “pre-money” valuation).122 
Those additional funds from the Series A round were necessary for the 
company to be in a position to start achieving any kind of meaningful 
scale.123 
With a company founded in 2014, however, the founder can instead 
raise $500,000 to $750,000 of capital in a “seed round” and perhaps buy 
herself a year to eighteen months of runway.124 With that longer period 
of time, she can build and sometimes significantly scale the business, 
achieving more impressive milestones before having to approach VC 
firms for a Series A round.125 Raising funds from that more advantageous 
position allows the founder to command a significantly higher valuation 
for the company, thereby keeping more of the ownership for herself. To 
provide a quantitative example of this point, since the company is able to 
be much more capital efficient and is further along in its growth, perhaps 
the founder would sell $3 million worth of Series A Preferred Stock to 
the VC fund, but at a pre-money valuation of between $9 million to 
$12 million (giving up only twenty percent to twenty-five percent of the 
company instead of one-third). Thus, it now makes great economic sense, 
from a founder’s perspective, to raise a more substantial seed round than 
was previously the case because of how much more the founder can 
 
 122. See Coyle & Polsky, supra note 83, at 288–89 (discussing the early stages of startup financing); 
Ibrahim, supra note 74, at 1413 (describing the typical venture capital investment contract as employing 
staged financing) (citing Steven N. Kaplan & Per Strömberg, Financial Contracting Theory Meets the 
Real World: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts, 70 Rev. Econ. Stud. 281, 304 (2003)). 
 123. See Coyle & Polsky, supra note 83, at 288 (“At the very early stages of a company’s 
development, there will be a seed round in which the company raises capital to launch the 
enterprise.”); see also Brian Broughman & Jesse M. Fried, Carrots and Sticks: How VCs Induce 
Entrepreneurial Teams to Sell Startups, 98 Cornell L. Rev. 1319, 1327 (2013) (“Most venture-backed 
startups issue a new series of preferred stock for each round of financing.”). 
 124. While it may seem counterintuitive that the amount of capital raised in these seed financings 
was increasing at the same time that the costs of starting a business were falling, the explanation lies in 
the amount of time, or runway, that a given amount of capital was afforded a start-up founder. In the 
pre-cloud world, $500,000 to $750,000 would likely not have allowed a start-up founder to accomplish 
much more than they could have if they raised $250,000 or less. To get a technology business off the 
ground simply required a much larger amount of funds (typically in the millions). Post-cloud, however, 
$750,000 became sufficient to allow an entrepreneur to build a potentially substantial business over a 
year to eighteen months before having to raise a more significant round of financing.  
 125. Startups receive venture capital funding only after an initial period when the company has 
survived the earliest stages and is expanding. Ibrahim, supra note 74, at 1416–19. The time gap 
between the beginning of a startup’s life and the first round of financing is typically one year. Id. at 
1416. A more developed company would more easily attract venture capital funding. See id. at 1417. 
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achieve with those amounts and how it better positions the company for 
a subsequent round of financing.126 
Raising a larger seed round, however, presents issues of its own. 
When the company was raising $250,000 or less, most investors would 
have been allocated less than $50,000 apiece (with many investing only 
$25,000, or even as little as $10,000). For such a small investment, even 
the more sophisticated angels were largely willing to invest in common 
stock alongside the founder, with nothing in the way of traditional VC-
style rights or protections. After all, the logic went, it was an insignificant 
investment in the portfolios of these high-net-worth individuals and 
typically viewed as not much more than a lottery ticket.127 However, for a 
new company raising a seed round of $500,000 to $750,000, perhaps the 
angels would be investing several hundred thousand dollars each. Since 
this was a more substantial sum, these angels decided that they wanted 
more for their money than mere common stock with no further 
assurances.128 
At the same time, the most obvious alternative to common stock—a 
full VC-style preferred stock financing—seemed to many as being too 
involved for the amount of money being invested.129 In particular, there 
was sensitivity surrounding legal fees, as the fees associated with 
preferred stock financings did not decrease just because the company 
was raising only $500,000 instead of $3 million or $5 million.130 This 
meant that the transaction costs consumed a much larger percentage of 
the new capital in the seed-financing context than they would have in a 
larger Series A round. Moreover, many angel investors did this type of 
investing more as a hobby than a profession.131 Consequently, the angels 
were often not particularly sophisticated when it came to venture 
financing terms and were not well equipped to negotiate the full array of 
rights associated with VC-style preferred stock.132 Many also lacked the 
 
 126. One survey has found that although the number of seed financings increased from 472 in 2009 to 
1749 in 2012, the number of Series A rounds only increased from 418 to 692 during this same time period. 
Fenwick & West LLP, 2012 Seed Financing Survey: Internet/Digital Media and Software Industries 
3 (2013), available at http://www.fenwick.com/publications/Pages/Seed-Finance-Survey-2012.aspx. 
 127. Interview with Attorney, New York Law Firm I, supra note 96. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id.; Susan C. Morse, Startup Ltd.: Tax Planning and Initial Incorporation Location, 14 Fla. 
Tax. Rev. 319, 342–44 (2013) (discussing resource constraints in early-stage companies). 
 130. Interview with Attorney, New York Law Firm III (Nov. 13, 2013). 
 131. Ibrahim, supra note 74, at 1439 (“Many if not most angels are ex-entrepreneurs who miss the 
excitement of being part of a start-up but not necessarily the headaches and grueling schedule that 
come with full responsibility for one.”). 
 132. John L. Orcutt, Improving the Efficiency of the Angel Finance Market: A Proposal to 
Expand the Intermediary Role of Finders in the Private Capital Raising Setting, 37 Ariz. St. L.J. 861, 
879 (2005) (“Some angels are extremely sophisticated in financial and investment matters and invest in 
a manner similar to professional investors. The majority of angels, however, do not appear to be as 
highly sophisticated.”). 
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appetite to do so, either because they were busy with their primary 
occupations or because they invested in so many seed-stage companies 
that they did not have the capacity to spend time and resources heavily 
negotiating preferred stock terms for each investment.133 Founders, 
meanwhile, were eager to stretch these seed dollars as far as they 
possibly could, because every dollar spent on fees would mean less 
runway, and ultimately, could mean a lower valuation at the next 
financing round.134 
This left both founders and angel investors looking for financing 
instruments that would provide more protection than common stock but 
would have less complexity and lower transaction costs than a full-scale 
Series A Convertible Preferred Stock financing. With these needs in 
mind, the contracts that had long been used to structure venture capital 
investments in the United States began to evolve and change. The 
process of evolution—and the changes that this process ultimately 
produced—are described in the next two Parts. Part IV first discusses the 
ways in which attorneys and investors adapted the convertible notes, 
historically used principally in the bridge loan context, to provide seed 
funding to early-stage technology companies. Part V then analyzes the 
ways in which many of these same individuals sought to adapt the 
traditional Series A financing documents to the same end by developing 
“stripped-down” versions of these same documents. 
IV.  Seed Notes 
As the costs of launching a new start-up fell, investors in Silicon 
Valley and elsewhere began to look for contracts that could be used to 
commit capital to these ventures. Over time, more and more of these 
investors, entrepreneurs, and their attorneys found themselves 
gravitating to the convertible note as a contractual form well-suited to 
their needs. While the turn to this instrument was not entirely new—the 
convertible note had been used occasionally to provide initial funding for 
companies in the pre-cloud era—its increased use in the post-cloud era 
marked a massive shift in its perceived utility in the seed finance 
community.135 
This Part first chronicles the convertible note’s rise to prominence in 
the cloud computing era and explains precisely why investors and 
entrepreneurs found these contracts so useful. It then discusses one 
particular contractual innovation—the conversion price cap—and 
explains how and why it gradually came to be incorporated into most 
 
 133. Telephone Interview with Attorney, AmLaw 100 Law Firm I (Dec. 9, 2013). 
 134. Interview with Attorney, New York Law Firm III, supra note 130. 
 135. See Ibrahim, supra note 74, at 1430 n.119 (discussing use of convertible notes to provide seed 
financing prior to 2005); see also supra note 78. 
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convertible notes. The Part concludes by discussing two proposals to 
strip away the debt-like features of the convertible note in order to 
recognize, formally, what is already often true in fact—that the 
convertible note is not really a debt instrument so much as it is a means 
of making deferred equity investments in early-stage technology 
companies. 
A. The Rise of the Seed Note 
The earliest financings using seed notes essentially duplicated 
existing form contracts for bridge notes with little to no customization for 
the earlier stage of the investment.136 Since the bridge notes already 
envisioned a conversion into stock at the next equity financing, the off-
the-shelf bridge documentation worked fairly well in the seed context. 
Over time, however, certain features that were typical of bridge notes 
were modified in the forms used for seed notes. For instance, to simplify 
documentation, the concept of warrant coverage was replaced with a 
more straightforward discount to the actual price in the next equity 
financing.137 In addition to the reduction of paperwork by eliminating the 
standalone warrant, this change had the further benefit of avoiding some 
adverse tax consequences associated with warrants.138 Security interests 
also largely fell by the wayside, as they provided little to no protection 
for investors in a seed-stage company, few of which would have had any 
meaningful assets to serve as collateral.139 
Once the bridge notes had been modified along the preceding lines, 
the resulting seed notes offered a number of advantages to the investor. 
Should the company not survive long enough to raise additional 
financing, the fact that the investor held debt instead of equity would 
entitle her to any remaining cash or other assets of the company in a 
dissolution—up to the principal and interest of her notes—before equity 
holders received anything.140 And if the company should ultimately be 
able to attract additional investment, the investor could convert the note 
into the same security that the first institutional VC investors would 
receive (usually Series A Convertible Preferred Stock) with the same 
 
 136. Telephone Interview with Attorney, AmLaw 100 Law Firm III (Jan. 27, 2014). 
 137. Id. 
 138. See Jack S. Levin, Structuring Venture Capital, Private Equity, and Entrepreneurial 
Transactions 5–51 (2009) (discussing tax allocations when warrants are issued along with other securities). 
 139. Telephone Interview with Attorney, AmLaw 100 Law Firm III, supra note 136. 
 140. Coyle & Polsky, supra note 83, at 290 (“In the event the startup is liquidated before a note is 
converted, the noteholder traditionally was entitled to a return of his investment plus accrued 
interest.”); William W. Bratton, Venture Capital on the Downside: Preferred Stock and Corporate 
Control, 100 Mich. L. Rev. 891, 915 (2002) (stating that the issuance convertible debt and preferred 
stock with liquidation preferences increase the cost of poor performance to an entrepreneur who 
would face longer odds at a positive return in the event of liquidation). 
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rights, preferences, and privileges accorded to holders of that stock.141 
Instead of having to spend time negotiating these various rights and a 
price with the founder, moreover, the use of convertible notes would 
allow the later investor to do so at that investor’s time and expense; the 
early investor would simply convert her notes at a discount to that Series 
A price. These features thus struck a balance between giving early-stage 
investors more protection than common stock investments provided and 
keeping the terms simple enough to save time and transaction costs.142 
The use of convertible notes also offered a number of advantages 
from the founders’ perspective. First, the legal fees associated with the 
issuance of a convertible note were a mere fraction of those associated 
with the issuance of preferred stock. In instances in which the amount of 
capital being invested in a particular business was reasonably small—say 
$100,000—the difference between incurring $5,000 to $15,000 in legal 
fees for a convertible note financing and $20,000 to $35,000 for a 
“venture-style” Series A financing loomed large. Second, the use of 
convertible notes enabled the founder to defer negotiations over the 
valuation of the company until the next financing, when she hoped to 
have more leverage.143 Not having to negotiate a price and extensive 
terms at the seed stage was also particularly appealing when the investors 
consisted mostly of friends and family, with whom a founder may be 
reluctant to play hardball.144 Instead, the founder could tell his investors 
that they would receive the same security that a future venture capitalist 
would receive in the next financing round, but at a discounted price.145 
To be sure, there are also disadvantages associated with the use of 
convertible notes. If the note matures before a conversion event, the 
company is obligated to repay the principal and accrued interest in full 
unless the noteholder agrees to grant an extension.146 Since the company 
will rarely (if ever) have sufficient funds to do so, the lenders may have 
leverage to renegotiate the economics of their investment in their 
 
 141. They would also sometimes receive the benefit of many of the other rights typically associated 
with Series A Preferred Stock, such as anti-dilution protection, preemptive rights, registration rights, 
rights of first refusal, and co-sale rights. Andrew Metrick & Ayako Yasuda, Venture Finance & the 
Finance of Innovation 151–61 (2011). 
 142. Bratton, supra note 140, at 895 (“The most likely venture capital transaction structure entails 
neither full protection nor classic preferred stock vulnerability. In the majority of transactions, the 
venture capitalist emerges at a midpoint on the protection range . . . .”). 
 143. Leavitt, supra note 78, at 257 (stating that one of the benefits of utilizing a convertible note is 
that the instrument defers the valuation negotiation). One additional advantage of deferring the 
valuation negotiation is that it allows the start-up to issue equity-based incentive compensation to new 
employees at a low basis for tax purposes. See Gregg D. Polsky & Brant J. Hellwig, Examining the 
Tax Advantage of Founders’ Stock, 97 Iowa L. Rev. 1085, 1098 (2012). 
 144. Interview with Attorney, New York Law Firm III, supra note 130. 
 145. Interview with Attorney, New York Law Firm II, supra note 90. 
 146. See Triantis, supra note 94, at 317 (stating that a characteristic of convertible debt is definite 
maturity). 
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favor.147 Also, there are disadvantages from a noteholder’s perspective. 
In contrast to common stockholders, the holder of a convertible note is 
not owed any fiduciary duties by the principals of the company, which 
means that the investors’ ability to control the founder is constrained by 
the (limited) contractual rights set forth in the note.148 Assuming the next 
round of financing is obtained before the note matures, however, and 
assuming that the founders are true to their word, then the convertible 
note offers protections that are more robust than those offered by 
common stock at a cost that is far lower than that available through a full 
Series A financing. 
B. The Conversion Price Cap 
As the seed note grew in popularity, some individuals who invested 
in companies that subsequently achieved sky-high valuations came to 
regret their initial decision to structure the investment in the form of a 
seed note rather than equity. In response to this problem, there evolved a 
contractual innovation known as the conversion price cap. Although the 
precise origins of this provision are unclear, our interviews suggested that 
it was a standard feature of most convertible notes by 2007 or 2008.149 
Today, few seed note rounds are done without including conversion 
caps.150 It has become the market convention and is far and away the 
most noteworthy and widely-adopted innovation in convertible debt 
terms to date. 
 
 147. Interview with Attorney, New York Law Firm II, supra note 90. 
 148. Simons v. Cogan, 542 A.2d 785, 789 (Del. Ch. 1987) (“The implication of Harff was, of course, 
that, as creditors, holders of such debt were not the beneficiaries of fiduciary duties.”) (referring to 
Harff v. Kerkorian, 324 A.2d 215 (Del. Ch. 1974)). 
 149. In the course of our research, we identified at least one convertible note containing a 
conversion price cap that was issued in 1999. See Unsecured Convertible Promissory Note Issued 
by AmericasLawyer.com, Inc. (Nov. 2, 1999) (on file with John Coyle). Our interviews suggested, 
however, that such provisions did not come into widespread use until almost a decade later. 
 150. A survey conducted in 2012 found that conversion price caps could be found in ninety percent 
of convertible seed note financings done in that year. Fenwick & West LLP, supra note 126, at 7. One 
possible explanation for the prevalence of conversion caps was the growing power of angels and so-
called “superangels” in the early-stage venture finance ecosystem. Around the time that seed notes 
started including conversion caps, an increasing number of companies were competing for seed funds. 
With more founders looking to raise a larger seed round, the profile and importance of the role of 
angel investors as a source of initial capital increased, as very few founders could raise $1 million from 
friends and family alone. With the greater need for start-up capital, competition for providing that 
capital also increased, drawing more sophisticated angels to pool their resources into investing clubs or 
networks. Some of the most prominent angel investors even began managing other angels’ money, 
effectively becoming early-stage venture capital funds. At the same time, established, later-stage VC 
funds created seed-arms that were focused on this earliest stage of financing to try to capture some of 
the outsized returns that many angel investors were capturing by investing early in some extremely 
successful Internet and social media companies. The entry of these more sophisticated players, 
coupled with the increased reliance of founders on these investors for seed capital, contributed to the 
rise and eventual primacy of the conversion cap in seed note financings.  
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The origins of the conversion price cap lie in a now-standard note 
provision known as the discount, which states that the principal of the 
notes would convert into Series A convertible preferred stock at the next 
equity round of financing at a discount (typically twenty percent) to the 
Series A price.151 If the new investors were paying $1.00 per share for 
Series A stock, in other words, the seed noteholders would convert their 
notes at a price of $0.80 per share. While this ability to acquire Series A 
shares at a discount was advantageous to noteholders, it also had the 
potential to create headaches for the investors, as illustrated by the 
following scenario. 
Imagine that seed investors in a company have the choice between 
investing in (1) a seed note or (2) stock. They choose to structure the 
investment as a seed note with a twenty percent conversion discount 
because it is simple, inexpensive, and does not require the parties to 
negotiate a valuation for the company. Had they gone the equity route, 
however, assume that they could have bought stock at a valuation for the 
company of approximately $5 million. The company subsequently raises 
a Series A round at a pre-money valuation of $25 million. On the one 
hand, the seed investors are thrilled that their investment has turned out 
so well. On the other hand, they may also be experiencing buyer’s 
remorse for not having spent the time and cost negotiating that $5 
million valuation for equity. Had they purchased equity, their investment 
would have increased several times over in value and they would have 
ended up owning a significant percentage of the company. Having used a 
convertible note, however, these investors will see that note convert at a 
twenty percent discount to the price implied by the $25 million valuation, 
which will result in a substantially lower return on their investment and 
ownership of a significantly smaller percentage of the company. 
As more seed note investors experienced the type of “valuation 
whiplash” just described, the convertible note instrument evolved to 
address this concern. Specifically, the attorneys drafting these notes 
began to write a “conversion price cap” into the contract.152 The 
conversion price cap imposed a ceiling on the price at which a seed note 
would convert into the equity security sold at the next equity financing. 
Continuing with the example above, let us assume that the seed notes 
had included a conversion cap of $10 million. This would mean that if the 
company raised its next round of financing at a pre-money valuation 
below $10 million, the seed noteholders would still convert at a price 
twenty percent below the price paid by the new investors. However, in 
the event that the company raised that next round at a $25 million 
valuation, the noteholders would be able to convert their notes at a price 
 
 151. Telephone Interview with Attorney, AmLaw 100 Law Firm III, supra note 136. 
 152. Telephone Interview with Attorney, AmLaw 100 Law Firm I, supra note 133. 
Coyle_26 (TEIXEIRA).DOC (Do Not Delete) 11/26/2014 2:19 PM 
December 2014]                 CONTRACTUAL INNOVATION 165 
implied by a $10 million valuation instead (an effective discount much 
greater than the typical twenty percent off the actual Series A price). By 
including a conversion price cap in the note, the seed investors were thus 
able to realize a significantly greater return than would have been 
possible in the absence of such a cap. While the conversion price cap is 
not entirely costless from the founder’s perspective, it solved a problem 
that had bedeviled investors and paved the way for the continued 
widespread use of seed notes in venture finance.153 
C. The End of the Seed Note? 
Over the course of the past decade, the outcomes for investors in 
seed notes came to be viewed as largely binary: (1) the company is either 
successful enough to raise an equity round, in which case the seed notes 
convert into stock, or (2) the company is unable to raise additional 
capital, in which case the investors likely experience a total loss.154 Given 
this reality, many investors adopted the view that seed notes were better 
thought of as a deferred equity investment rather than debt. 
As the view that convertible notes were a deferred equity 
investment gained traction, the debt-like features of these notes came to 
be viewed as annoyances in some quarters. In Silicon Valley, the 
overwhelming majority of the notes had a maturity date of one year 
 
 153. These caps present two significant issues from a founder’s perspective. The first problem 
stems from the conversion of the seed notes into preferred stock with a liquidation preference. When 
the new investors purchase Series A stock, they typically have a dollar-for-dollar liquidation 
preference, the idea being that their original investment should be returned before the common 
stockholders receive a return if the valuation in an exit is not high enough for the preferred stock to 
convert to common stock. However, in a situation where seed noteholders are converting at a 
valuation cap that ends up being a fraction of the actual Series A valuation, the noteholders effectively 
receive a “free” liquidation preference that can be several multiples of their original investment. This 
not only raises the bar for the valuation at which a founder can share in a successful exit, but Series A 
investors often take umbrage with seed noteholders who receive, at a potentially astronomical 
discount, the very same security and liquidation preference the Series A investors are purchasing at 
full price. This first problem has been exacerbated by a second related problemthere has been 
significant downward pressure on the cap threshold, to the point that founders and seed investors 
appear to be setting that threshold low enough to approximate the current price the seed investors 
would be willing to pay for equity. This trend is increasing the frequency with which practitioners are 
encountering the scenario described above where the Series A valuation far exceeds the valuation cap 
for the seed note round. As conversion caps were set lower and consequently were creating more 
painful issues for founders at the time the notes converted, practitioners developed additional 
contractual innovations to try to mitigate these concerns. One method for alleviating the issues related 
to the “free” liquidation preference created by conversion caps was to issue preferred stock to 
noteholders based on the principal amounts of their notes so that their liquidation preferences would 
match the actual amounts they invested. Then, to give them the correct percentage of the company 
based on the economic deal implied by the conversion cap, they would receive additional common 
stock (which would not have a liquidation preference).  
 154. Interview with Attorney, New York Law Firm II, supra note 90. 
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owing to restrictions imposed by the California Finance Lender’s Law.155 
In cases in which the issuing company had not yet raised additional 
capital on the maturity date, therefore, the companies were obliged to 
either repay the note in full or to go back to their investors to negotiate 
an extension.156 While extensions were typically granted, the need to 
obtain them—and the possibility that an investor could bankrupt a pre-
revenue company by insisting upon repayment—distracted the founders 
from the task of growing the business and incurred additional legal 
costs.157 Furthermore, although the interest on the notes typically 
accrued over time, it was still necessary to determine periodically how 
much interest was, in fact, owed on the note.158 Since few, if any, 
investors were investing for the purpose of earning interest, and since the 
entrepreneurs were inclined to view the investment as deferred equity 
rather than debt in any event, the need to keep tabs on the accrued 
interest likewise came to be viewed as an unnecessary distraction.159 The 
complications posed by each of these issues were multiplied, moreover, 
when a single company had issued multiple series of notes to different 
investors with varying interest rates and conversion terms. 
This frustration with the debt-like features of convertible notes 
prompted several individuals to propose alternatives. In 2012, a Silicon 
Valley attorney and a Silicon Valley investor jointly proposed the 
creation of what they dubbed a “convertible security” as a replacement 
for the convertible note. In late 2013, an attorney at the start-up 
accelerator Y Combinator proposed a “simple agreement for future 
equity” (“SAFE”) as an alternative to the convertible note. Each of 
these proposals, which are discussed further below, sought to retain 
many of the existing features of convertible notes—including the 
discount and conversion cap provisions—while eliminating the terms that 
marked them as debt instruments. 
1. Convertible Security 
The convertible security was the brainchild of Yoichiro Taku, a 
partner at the law firm Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, and Adeo 
Ressi, the founder of the Founder’s Institute, a program for training 
 
 155. See Cal. Fin. Code § 22062(a)–(b) (2004) (requiring that any person engaged in the business 
of a finance lender to obtain a license from the state of California but making an exception for a 
venture capital company making a commercial bridge loan with a maturity date not to exceed one 
year). In 2014, the California State legislature approved amendments to this law that (1) exclude from 
its ambit certain types of investments made by venture capital companies, and (2) extend the 
permitted maturity date on commercial bridge loans to three years. S.B. 1181, 2013–14 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 
2014) (enacted). 
 156. Telephone Interview with Attorney, AmLaw 100 Law Firm III, supra note 136. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Telephone Interview with Carolynn Levy, Partner, Y Combinator (Jan. 21, 2014). 
 159. Id. 
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entrepreneurs.160 In essence, the convertible security is a convertible note 
that lacks a maturity date and an interest rate provision.161 Given the 
absence of these provisions, the security is not formally debt. On the 
other hand, it is also not a traditional equity instrument; the holder is not 
entitled to dividends and has no right to vote on matters affecting the 
corporation. The instrument is best conceptualized as a novel type of 
warrant for which the investor pays full value today for an unspecified 
future security at some later date. 
According to Taku, the drafting process that generated the proposal 
for the convertible security was straightforward.162 He drafted the 
documents primarily in consultation with Ressi, but occasionally 
discussed them with other attorneys at his law firm.163 Once the draft 
documents were complete, he asked an accounting firm to comment on 
them.164 As a final step, Taku and Ressi posted the draft documents to 
the Internet for comment in August 2012 and circulated them to several 
other attorneys. Their stated goal was to persuade investors and others to 
substitute the convertible security for the convertible note.165 
To date, anecdotal evidence suggests that the convertible security 
has not attracted a wide following.166 One possible reason is that the 
attributes of this particular contract are perceived to be friendlier to 
founders than to investors. Given the fact that the investors typically 
(though not always) have greater leverage in seed financing deals, 
investors may prefer to retain the debt-like protections of the convertible 
note because these provisions sometimes work to their advantage.167 
 
 160. See About, Founder Inst., http://fi.co/about# (last visited Dec. 14, 2014). 
 161. Telephone Interview with Yoichiro Taku, Partner, Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati 
(Jan. 27, 2014). 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. See Brian Axelrad, Investor Beware: Dirty Secrets of Angel Financing, LinkedIn (July 13, 
2014), https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/article/20140713161531-73993546-investor-beware-dirty-secrets-
of-angel-financing (“I would probably venture to say, at this point, all of these additional options [such 
as the convertible security] are only adding further confusion to the marketplace as entrepreneurs are 
increasingly unclear about which form of instrument to turn to. It is no surprise that, faced with this 
increasing buffet of financing instruments, entrepreneurs are more and more falling back on the 
original, basic form of convertible note.”). 
 167. See Manuel A. Utset, High-Powered (Mis)Incentives and Venture-Capital Contracts, 7 Ohio 
St. Entrepreneurial Bus. L. J. 45, 75 (2012) (“[T]he weaker party’s suggestions are an important 
source of potential contractual innovation which is lost when the weaker party has no incentive to 
suggest modifications to the standard contracts.”). In addition to having more leverage, the investors 
are also likely to be more knowledgeable when it comes to the terms of the proposed contract. Cf. Ola 
Bengtsson, Intermediaries in Negotiations of Complex Contracts: The Role of Attorneys in Venture 
Capital Transactions 5 (Mar. 17, 2009) (unpublished working paper), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1362236 (“[E]ntrepreneurs typically do not 
understand either the precise implications of every contractual term or how a proposed set of terms 
compares with those of other contracts used in similar VC financing situations.”). 
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Unless a particular founder enjoys substantial leverage in negotiations 
with an investor, in other words, it may prove difficult to persuade that 
investor to adopt a novel contractual structure that benefits the founder 
at the investor’s expense. 
2. Simple Agreement for Future Equity 
The SAFE was developed by attorney and Y Combinator partner 
Carolynn Levy. Y Combinator is a business accelerator that provides 
wide-ranging advice and support to early-stage companies.168 
Y Combinator provides a small amount of seed funding—typically no 
more than $20,000—to approximately 104 start-ups each year in 
exchange for small stakes in these companies.169 Owing to 
Y Combinator’s sterling reputation for identifying promising 
entrepreneurs, a number of other investors have pledged to commit 
$80,000 to any company that Y Combinator accepts into its program.170 
Levy joined Y Combinator in 2012 after more than a decade of 
representing Silicon Valley start-ups at the law firm of Wilson Sonsini.171 
Upon her arrival, the other partners asked her to come up with an 
entirely new form of investment contract that would remedy the 
perceived problems with the convertible note.172 Levy spent several 
months trying to develop a contract that was “creative” and 
“disruptive.”173 After several months of trying to think of something 
totally new and different, however, she ultimately came to the conclusion 
that “simplifying was a better approach than radical change. The 
community was more likely to accept something recognizable.”174 
At this point, she went back to (1) the convertible security that 
Y Combinator had been using for years in connection with its 
investments in startups, and (2) the convertible notes that had been used 
in many previous financings of Y Combinator startups, and decided to 
try to improve them rather than replace them.175 Levy ultimately took 
 
 168.  Coyle & Polsky, supra note 83, at 288 n.15. 
 169. Y Combinator Business Accelerator, Find the Best, http://business-
incubators.findthebest.com/l/15/Y-Combinator (last visited Dec. 14, 2014). The size of Y Combinator’s 
equity stakes range from two percent to ten percent. Id. 
 170. Leena Rao, Y Combinator’s YC VC Will Replace the Start Fund; Includes Yuir Milner, 
Andreessen Horowitz but Offers Less Money, TechCrunch (Nov. 26, 2012), 
http://techcrunch.com/2012/11/26/y-combinator-debuts-yc-vc-to-replace-the-start-fund-includes-yuri-
milner-andreessen-horowitz. 
 171. Telephone Interview with Carolynn Levy, supra note 158. Y Combinator was one of Levy’s 
clients while she was at Wilson Sonsini. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
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the basic convertible note and stripped the debt attributes out of it.176 
The result was a contract for deferred equity investment that she labeled 
the SAFE.177 In many respects, the SAFE closely resembles the 
convertible security proposed by Taku and Ressi in 2012.178 Each 
instrument drew heavily from the convertible note but saw its debt-like 
features stripped away. Each instrument stipulated that it would convert 
to equity upon the occurrence of a particular future event. And each 
instrument was intended to address basically the same perceived 
problems with convertible notes. There are, nevertheless, some 
noteworthy differences between the two instruments from the 
perspective of contractual innovation scholars. First, it appears that the 
process by which the SAFE was drafted was more extensive and 
collaborative than the process that generated the convertible security. 
Second, the SAFE was sponsored by an institution—Y Combinator—
that carries significant clout in Silicon Valley and is comfortable wielding 
that clout on behalf of entrepreneurs. 
In drafting the SAFE, Levy worked closely with two non-lawyer 
partners at Y Combinator. These partners provided feedback on the 
documents as they evolved.179 At periodic intervals, drafts of the 
documents were circulated to a wide set of partners at Y Combinator.180 
The Y Combinator partners also occasionally solicited informal feedback 
on the documents from friends and other investors in Silicon Valley.181 
As time passed, the circle widened.182 Individuals at venture capital firms 
with longstanding relationships with Y Combinator—such as SV Angel 
and Andreessen Horowitz—were also asked to provide feedback on the 
documents.183 
 
 176. Id. The new instrument was formally structured as a contract for a deferred equity investment 
that gave the holder the right to buy into the company if and when certain events occurred but did not 
require that a valuation be placed on the company immediately. See Financing Documents, 
Y Combinator (June 2014), www.ycombinator.com/documents. The triggering events in question—
liquidation, a new round of financing, change in control—were taken directly from the existing forms 
for convertible notes. Id. In addition, the new instrument explicitly envisioned that the parties would 
continue to negotiate a discount and/or a valuation cap in connection with their investment. See id. 
(including a valuation cap provision). 
 177. Telephone Interview with Carolynn Levy, supra note 158. 
 178. Adeo Ressi, Comment to Y Combinator: What Is the Difference Between Y Combinator’s 
New SAFE Financing Method and Ressi’s Convertible Equity Financing Route?, Quora (Jan. 2, 
2014), http://www.quora.com/Y-Combinator/What-is-the-difference-between-Y-Combinators-new-
SAFE-financing-method-and-Ressis-Convertible-Equity-financing-route (“[T]he reality is that [the 
convertible security] and SAFE are the same thing: a convertible investment vehicle without debt.”). 
 179. Telephone Interview with Carolynn Levy, supra note 158. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. 
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Later in the process, Levy solicited input from other attorneys at 
law firms across Silicon Valley.184 In many cases, the feedback from 
outside attorneys was extensive.185 While some of these suggestions were 
ultimately incorporated into the documents, Levy consciously decided 
not to add certain additional terms to the document even when these 
terms may have served to clarify its meaning because her goal was to 
produce a document that was layperson-friendly.186 Since it is impossible 
to draft a contract to cover every contingency, and since the whole point 
of the SAFE was to provide a simple and inexpensive means of investing 
in an early-stage technology company, Levy thus chose to prioritize 
accessibility over comprehensiveness.187 The resulting document, in its 
simplest form, is only six pages long.188 
Notwithstanding its relative brevity, Levy noted that the most 
challenging part of the drafting process was to ensure that the SAFE 
struck a balance between the needs of entrepreneurs and the needs of 
investors.189 Levy remarked that she viewed herself as “drafting for a 
community rather than a client.”190 In this, she observed that her task 
was quite different from that of the prototypical corporate lawyer who 
drafts a document that advances the interests of one party (the lawyer’s 
client) at the expense of the other party.191 Since the efficiencies to be 
generated by the SAFE could only be achieved if both sides were of the 
view that it furthered their interests, Levy sought to ensure that the 
document was balanced.192 
Once the SAFE drafting process was complete, Y Combinator 
approached those institutions that invest in Y Combinator companies as 
a matter of course and suggested that they use the SAFE when investing 
in these companies. They all expressed willingness to adopt this 
instrument, provided feedback on it, and ultimately used it when 
 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. She also noted that these documents are rarely litigated in court. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. Convertible note forms, by way of comparison, are typically upwards of fifteen pages, many 
of which include a Note Purchase Agreement and stand-alone promissory notes for each noteholder. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. Although the ultimate goal of the SAFE was to supplant the convertible note, Levy 
reported that she did not view the SAFE as a particularly radical innovation. Id. This was not, it 
should be emphasized, because Levy was committed to avoiding disruptive change. Id. As discussed 
above, she initially went into the drafting with the express aim of developing a new and different type 
of investment contract. Id. Rather, it was because she viewed the SAFE as an incremental departure 
from the status quo—the next logical step in the evolution of the convertible note. Id. Any contract 
that bore such a strong resemblance to another, she believed, could hardly be viewed as radical. Id.  
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investing in the companies accepted into Y Combinator’s 2014 winter 
program.193 
V.  Seed Stock 
Even as the convertible note became increasingly popular as a tool 
for funding early-stage companies, law firms that specialize in venture 
capital finance also began creating simplified versions of their standard-
form Series A convertible preferred stock financing documents.194 To 
signal their origins, these simplified equity financing documents were 
given labels such as “Series Seed,” “Simple Series A,” “Series A-1” or 
“Series AA.” These documents sought to keep transaction costs down by 
minimizing due diligence and negotiation on documentation and, in so 
doing, to provide an equity alternative to seed notes that was comparable 
in terms of cost.195 
Significantly, these changes to the Series A financing documents 
were spurred by precisely the same developments chronicled above—
cloud computing, open-source software, and ease of scalability—that led 
to substantial innovation in the convertible note context. The effect of 
these developments on Series A financing documents, however, was 
precisely the opposite as it was in the case of the convertible note. As 
seed notes evolved into more complex contractual instruments, preferred 
stock financings evolved into simpler ones. The impact of a single set of 
economic and technological changes, in other words, led to very different 
innovations in different types of venture finance contracts.  
This Part first describes the basic characteristics of these newly 
simplified Series A financing documents and considers why some 
investors prefer them to the seed note in certain cases. It then discusses 
the process by which two particular sets of “model” simplified Series A 
documents—the so-called “Series AA” and “Series Seed”—were drafted 
and subsequently promulgated to the venture finance community. 
 
 193. Id. 
 194. One interviewee noted that stripped-down Series A documents were occasionally used in the 
pre-cloud era. See E-mail from In-House Counsel, supra note 78 (stating that “simple series a 
preferred” was sometimes used for seed funding in 1999). As was the case with respect to both the 
convertible note and the conversion price cap, however, the increased use of simplified Series A 
preferred stock in the post-cloud era marked a massive shift in its perceived utility in the seed finance 
community and its use increased dramatically in the years after 2005. 
 195. Wilson Sonsini LLP and Y Combinator published sample Series AA financing documents in 
2008. Financing Documents, supra note 176. Cooley LLP and TechStars published model Series AA 
seed financing documents in 2008. Open Sourced Model Seed Financing Documents, TechStars, 
http://www.techstars.com/docs (last visited Dec. 14, 2014). Fenwick & West LLP published its Series 
Seed documents in 2010. See Series Seed, http://www.seriesseed.com (last visited Dec. 14, 2014). 
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A. Adapting Convertible Preferred Stock to a Seed Round 
The primary difference between the classic Series A financing 
documents and the various stripped-down versions of these same 
documents is that a number of terms customarily included in the former 
are conspicuously absent from the latter. The stripped-down documents, 
for example, typically lack any language relating to dividend preferences, 
registration rights, or co-sale rights.196 They also frequently omit any 
provisions relating to price-based anti-dilution protection and have a less 
exhaustive list of representations and warranties and protective 
provisions.197 While each of these terms may be of some utility to venture 
capital funds making a sizable investment in a company as part of a 
traditional Series A financing, each is simply unnecessary in the context 
of a seed equity investment. 
These stripped-down financing documents do, however, provide 
some protections to the investor. Investors are typically granted a board 
seat and receive a right of first offer on future financings.198 They are 
typically entitled to a non-participating preferred liquidation 
preference.199 They frequently obtain certain blocking rights, such as the 
ability to prevent the company from being sold without their consent.200 
They may also require a “most favored nation” provision with respect to 
the terms discussed above that are omitted from stripped-down forms, 
allowing early investors to capture the benefits of terms they agree to 
give up at the seed stage later down the road.201 To be sure, the rights 
granted by these seed equity documents are less extensive than those 
that one would see in a traditional Series A or later-stage financing 
round. They are, however, considerably more robust than those typically 
included in a seed note. 
Given the existence of two options for raising a company’s first 
round of capital—seed stock and seed notes—that have become 
increasingly comparable from a cost perspective, there are a number of 
factors that tend to drive a founder toward using one or the other. The 
first and most important factor is what type of instrument the start-up’s 
investors prefer. There are many angels and early-stage VCs that are 
comfortable investing via seed notes containing conversion price caps.202 
Others, however, demand more pricing certainty and will only invest in 
 
 196. Telephone Interview with Yoichiro Taku, supra note 161. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Interview with Attorney, New York Law Firm I, supra note 96. 
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seed equity.203 Depending on which type of investor the founder is able 
to access through her network, the company could just as easily end up 
selling stock instead of convertible notes. The amount of capital being 
raised in the seed round also plays a part in this decision. For companies 
that are raising less than $500,000, the convention would be to use seed 
notes as the fundraising instrument.204 Conversely, for seed rounds in 
excess of a million dollars, the slightly higher transaction costs of a seed 
equity financing may seem a reasonable trade-off for certainty around 
price.205 
The trend over the last few years has undoubtedly been toward 
using convertible debt as the instrument of choice for a company’s first 
round of financing.206 However, with the falling cost of seed equity, some 
market players now seem to be moving toward simplified equity 
financings at the seed stage.207 This is not altogether surprising given, as 
we have seen, that seed notes began as a makeshift alternative to a costly 
preferred stock financing. As contractual innovations in preferred stock 
financings have decreased the cost and complexity of those transactions 
precipitously, the comparative advantage of seed notes (which now have 
some new drawbacks, largely due to conversion caps) has diminished. 
Nevertheless, there is a well-established market for convertible debt 
instruments among angels, superangels, and even some VC funds, which 
portends their continued role as a principal instrument of seed-stage 
finance well into the future. 
B. Drafting Simplified Series A Documents 
Over the past several years, several individuals have published 
model versions of stripped-down Series A financing documents. 
Although these documents represent important examples of contractual 
innovation, the innovation at issue is of a somewhat different type than 
in the context of the convertible security and the SAFE. The convertible 
security and the SAFE were innovative in the sense that they were 
contracts containing terms that had never before been used in 
combination. The model stripped-down Series A documents, by contrast, 
are innovative in the sense that they assembled a number of innovations 
previously developed by a variety of actors into a single comprehensive 
package. These differences notwithstanding, the essence of each project 
was the same—an attempt to draft language that would advance the 
 
 203. See, e.g., Fred Wilson, Some Thoughts on Convertible Debt, AVC (Aug. 31, 2010), 
http://www.avc.com/2010/08/some-thoughts-on-convertible-debt. 
 204. Interview with Attorney, New York Law Firm I, supra note 96. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Interview with Attorney, New York Law Firm III, supra note 130. 
 207. Id. 
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general project of giving parties more and better options when 
negotiating contract terms. 
In order to gain insight into the drafting process that ultimately 
resulted in several of these model stripped-down Series A documents, we 
interviewed the drafters of two different sets of such documents. First, we 
interviewed a Colorado attorney who helped to prepare a set of model 
documents (the “Series AA”) on behalf of TechStars, a Colorado-based 
start-up accelerator, in 2008. Second, we interviewed a Silicon Valley 
attorney who drafted and published a different set of model documents 
(the “Series Seed”) in 2010. Each of these proposals sought to eliminate 
certain provisions in Series A financing documents that were 
unnecessary in seed financing rounds while retaining those terms that 
investors deemed valuable. 
1. Series AA 
The set of Series AA documents published by TechStars were 
developed by two attorneys who practice law at Cooley LLP in 
Broomfield, Colorado (next to the technology cluster in Boulder): 
Michael Platt and Noah Pittard. In an interview, Pittard explained that 
the promulgation of the Series AA documents was an attempt to 
standardize documents that were frequently idiosyncratic.208 In the post-
cloud era, he explained, every law firm had developed its proprietary set 
of stripped-down Series A financing documents.209 While the documents 
prepared by different firms were broadly similar, each firm’s own set of 
documents was unique.210 Within each of these firms, moreover, each 
individual partner tended to work exclusively with her own personalized 
version of the firm’s proprietary documents.211 As a consequence of all 
this variation, Pittard explained, the legal costs in venture finance 
transactions were excessive at times.212 
Pittard could not remember precisely whether the idea to develop 
the Series AA documents originated with the attorneys at Cooley or with 
TechStars.213 Most likely, he said, the idea grew out of conversations 
between the two parties.214 Once the decision to publish these documents 
was made, however, the drafting process was fairly straightforward 
because the Cooley attorneys drew extensively upon their own firm’s 
existing forms.215 Pittard explained that what ultimately became the 
 
 208. Telephone Interview with Noah Pittard, Special Counsel, Cooley LLP (Feb. 13, 2014). 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. TechStars had been a client of the firm since the company’s inception. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. 
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Series AA documents began as a project for a Cooley client in search of 
a cost-effective means of investing in very small founder-friendly equity 
rounds.216 Although these documents underwent some changes prior to 
their release as TechStars model documents—most notably, the closing 
mechanics were modified so as to permit rolling closings rather than 
having all investors sign and close on the same day at the same time—the 
bulk of the drafting work had occurred long before.217 As Pittard put it: 
“It was really just a question of us adding some blanks and deleting some 
client names and sending them over.”218 Once the revisions were 
complete, TechStars posted the Series AA documents to the Internet 
with a statement urging potential users to “think of them as a good 
starting point that can save you some time and money.”219 
Although he was largely satisfied with the Series AA documents 
that he developed with his colleagues at Cooley, Pittard acknowledged 
that the National Venture Capital Association (“NVCA”)—an industry 
trade association—was in many ways better positioned to develop a 
standardized set of stripped-down Series A financing documents.220 He 
cited the influence that NVCA’s set of model Series A documents had 
had on standardizing the terms of traditional Series A financings.221 
Using documents with which lawyers on both sides are familiar is value-
enhancing for the client, he explained, because it enables corporate 
attorneys to focus on value-additive strategic advice rather than, say, on 
how a particular firm drafts complicated anti-dilution provisions.222 He 
added that, notwithstanding his own work in the area, he would welcome 
any attempt by the NVCA to promulgate model stripped-down Series A 
financing documents. 
2. Series Seed 
The Series Seed documents published in 2010 were the brainchild of 
Ted Wang, a partner at the law firm of Fenwick & West LLP in Silicon 
Valley. In an interview, Wang explained that the impetus for drafting the 
documents stemmed from his frustration with the high costs of a 
traditional Series A round.223 These high costs, he felt, were attributable 
in large part to contract provisions in standard Series A form documents 
 
 216. E-mail from Noah Pittard, Special Counsel, Cooley LLP, to John Coyle (Apr. 1, 2014, 5:23 PM) 
(on file with John Coyle). Pittard stated that the size of these “very small” equity rounds was in the 
range of $100k to $200k. Id. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Telephone Interview with Noah Pittard, supra note 208. 
 219. See Open Sourced Model Seed Financing Documents, supra note 195. 
 220. Telephone Interview with Noah Pittard, supra note 208. 
 221. Id. He also analogized the NVCA documents to Delaware corporate law in that both contain 
rules and provisions with which attorneys who represent venture capital clients are familiar. Id. 
 222. Id. 
 223. Telephone Interview with Ted Wang, Partner, Fenwick & West LLP (Jan. 27, 2014). 
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that were largely irrelevant to seed equity investors today.224 
Accordingly, Wang set about stripping vestigial and otherwise 
superfluous provisions from the classic financing documents.225 While his 
primary objective in undertaking this project was to address a specific 
problem—the high costs of doing seed equity rounds—he also saw the 
preparation of the Series Seed documents as a form of “pro bono” work 
that would benefit the entire seed investing community as a whole.226 
Wang prepared most of the contracts that ultimately became the 
Series Seed documents while working largely alone, but with the help of 
his colleagues at Fenwick.227 While he circulated the documents to a 
number of other attorneys to ask for comments, he specifically did not 
try to convene a committee of lawyers to “bless” the documents.228 He 
explained that he had learned from past experience that it was difficult, if 
not impossible, to get a group of experienced transactional attorneys to 
agree on model terms in a given set of documents.229 By contrast, Wang 
actively sought out the leading seed funders at the time—including Marc 
Andreessen, a well-known venture capitalist—for the purpose of asking 
them to bless these same documents.230 When the Series Seed documents 
were finally posted to the web, Wang specifically disclaimed that the 
documents were his own firm’s model documents, stating instead that he 
“considered them to be jointly owned by the entire seed investing 
community.”231 
While the decision to focus on the needs of seed investors rather 
than attorneys may at first glance seem curious—lawyers, after all, like to 
think their views carry great weight—it was entirely sensible given that 
the ultimate users of these documents would be seed investors. As Wang 
explained: “From a distribution strategy perspective, it was more helpful 
to get the money guys behind it.”232 If the Series Seed documents were to 
come into widespread use—and the evidence to date suggests that these 
documents are being used—it was arguably more important for the 
investors to like it than for other lawyers to accept it as an ideal model 
form.233 
 
 224. Id. 
 225. Id. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. 
 228. Id. 
 229. Id. 
 230. One of the people whose support Wang solicited—and who subsequently became an 
enthusiastic advocate for the Series Seed—was Marc Andreessen, a well-known venture capitalist. Id. 
 231. Ted Wang, For the Faithful, Series Seed, http://www.seriesseed.com/posts/for-the-
faithful.html (last visited Dec. 14, 2014). 
 232. Telephone Interview with Ted Wang, supra note 223. 
 233. See Yoichiro Taku, How Do the Sample Series Seed Financing Documents Differ from 
Typical Series A Financing Documents?, Startup Company Law. (Mar. 14, 2010), 
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VI.  Theories of Contractual Innovation in Practice 
While the foregoing story of contractual evolution and change in 
venture finance is interesting in its own right, it is also significant for the 
insights that it can offer to scholars who study the process of contractual 
innovation. This Part draws upon the changes that have occurred in 
venture finance contracts over the past decade to contribute to the 
literature in this area. 
This Part first considers whether the above-described changes to 
venture finance contracts are consistent with certain theories of 
contractual innovation. It argues that while some of these changes are 
consistent with what these theories predict, others are not. This Part then 
explores the specific role played by attorneys—in contrast to contract 
users or trade associations—in the process of contractual innovation. It 
argues that although attorneys enjoy a number of advantages in 
developing these innovations, their ultimate success will be determined 
less by the attorney’s technical skill at drafting and more by the 
relationships that the attorney develops with the end users of the 
contract. Finally, this Part suggests that the substitution of one type of 
contract for another—using equity instead of debt, for example—is itself 
an innovation that has gone largely unappreciated in the contractual 
innovation literature. 
A. Theories of Innovation and Change 
In light of the narrative set forth in the previous Parts, one question 
that naturally arises is how well the story of contractual innovation in 
venture finance tracks more general theories as to how and why 
contractual innovation occurs. As described earlier, one such theory—
advanced by Choi, Gulati, and Posner—posits that the process of 
contractual innovation occurs in three stages.234 In stage one, a particular 
standard form dominates the market.235 Stage two begins when some 
external shock disrupts the market and prompts marginal market players 
to propose changes to the prevailing standard.236 In stage three, high-
volume or high-status intermediaries recognize that some change is 
inevitable and each begins to promote its own version of the new 
standard.237 During stage three, the theory predicts that there will be 
multiple competing standards jockeying for market share.238 After a 
 
http://www.startupcompanylawyer.com/2010/03/14/how-do-the-sample-series-seed-financing-
documents-differ-from-typical-series-a-financing-documents (“The only way that the Series Seed 
documents will be widely used is if investors demand use of the documents.”). 
 234. Choi et al., supra note 1, at 10. 
 235. Id. 
 236. Id. 
 237. Id. 
 238. See id. 
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period of time, one standard emerges as the market leader and becomes 
the new standard form until another external shock occurs.239 
The evolution of certain venture finance contracts over the past 
decade offers some evidence that is consistent with this theory of 
contractual change and some evidence that is inconsistent with it. 
Proceeding chronologically, it seems clear that the world of early-stage 
venture finance contracts prior to 2005—stage one—was dominated by 
not one, but two forms: common stock and convertible preferred stock. 
The former was typically used by friends, family, and angel investors 
investing relatively small sums of money early in a company’s lifecycle, 
whereas the latter was typically used by institutional venture capital 
funds investing larger sums at later stages. In one sense, therefore, it is 
inaccurate to suggest that a single standard form dominated the market. 
If, however, one defines the relevant market more narrowly—such that 
there was one market for individual investors and another market for 
institutional investors—then one standard form could be said to have 
dominated each market in the pre-cloud era. 
Turning then to stage two, it seems clear that the various 
developments discussed in Part III—the rise of cloud-computing, the 
increased availability of open-source software, and the ability to scale a 
business quickly—constituted a market shock that brought about 
significant changes to the status quo. The increased use of convertible 
notes and the development of simplified convertible preferred stock can 
be explained in substantial part by this shock.240 The prevailing theory 
also predicts, however, that market shocks will prompt marginal market 
players to propose changes to the prevailing standard.241 This prediction 
is inconsistent with our findings. While we were unable to identify the 
precise origins of a number of innovations, we were able to identify two 
specific proposals to modify the terms of the seed note. These proposals 
originated from individuals who cannot be fairly described as marginal 
market players. Taku is a partner at Wilson Sonsini—one of the premier 
law firms in Silicon Valley—and Ressi operates a well-known institute 
that seeks to train entrepreneurs. Levy is a former partner at the law firm 
of Wilson Sonsini and is currently a partner at the best-known start-up 
accelerator in Silicon Valley—Y Combinator. While it remains to be 
seen whether the convertible security or the SAFE will ultimately be 
 
 239. Id. 
 240. The timing of other proposed innovations, however, was not closely related to the timing of 
the shock. The convertible security and the SAFE, for example, were proposed in 2012 and 2013, 
respectively, well after cloud computing had come into widespread use in technology start-ups. Thus, 
while market shocks ushered in some contractual innovations, other innovations were proposed even 
in their absence. See Weidemaier, supra note 34, at 73 (discussing contractual change in the absence of 
a market shock). 
 241. Id. at 108. 
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widely adopted, there can be little doubt that each of these proposals 
originated from a high-status market player rather than a marginal one. 
At stage three, the theory predicts that high-volume intermediaries, 
such as law firms, will recognize that change is inevitable and will begin 
to promote their own versions of the new standard. This hypothesis is 
generally consistent with our findings. After an initial phase in which 
various law firms developed their own stripped-down Series A financing 
documents, several different “model” versions of documents were 
promulgated by individuals at several different high-status law firms 
working in conjunction with several different high-status groups 
representing investors or entrepreneurs.242 Each of these sets of model 
documents, which in some cases were simply a particular law firm’s 
proprietary forms with a light edit, can be said to be jockeying for market 
position with the others. It is not clear, however, that any one of them 
will ultimately emerge as a definitive market leader. Given the 
fragmented nature of the market for early-stage venture capital 
investments, the variety of different types of contractual forms, and the 
idiosyncratic preferences of angel investors and venture capital funds, it 
may well be that no one set of documents will ever come to dominate the 
market.243 Time alone will tell. 
In summary, the theory of contractual innovation proposed by Choi, 
Gulati, and Posner—which was developed against a backdrop of changes 
in sovereign debt contracts—can only partially explain the recent 
changes made to venture finance contracts. While the theory accurately 
predicts the significance of an exogenous shock and a rush by high-status 
market players to promote their own versions of a new standard once 
change is perceived as inevitable, it (inaccurately) suggests that 
innovations will bubble up from marginal market players when, in fact, a 
number of noteworthy proposals for innovation have originated from 
high-status players. The theory also fails to account for the fact that 
several significant innovations were proposed well after the occurrence 
of an exogenous shock. 
B. The Role of Attorneys in Contractual Innovation 
The prevailing view in the literature is that attorneys play an 
outsized role in driving the process of contractual innovation due to their 
role as intermediaries who deal with certain types of contracts in 
 
 242. The law firms are Wilson Sonsini, Fenwick & West LLP, and Cooley LLP. The investor 
groups are Y Combinator, Andreessen Horowitz, and TechStars, respectively. 
 243. Venture finance contracts are unique in that they are interchangeable to a significant extent. 
An investor may, for example, choose to structure his investment as either common stock or 
convertible notes or stripped-down Series A or even a classic Series A financing. Innovations with 
respect to one type of contract can thus drive innovations in other types. 
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significant volume.244 While our findings suggest that each of these 
propositions is true to a point, they also suggest that these advantages are 
less important than they may appear at first glance. 
Our findings tend to confirm that attorneys are well-positioned to 
serve as contract innovators. Each of the attorneys interviewed had been 
in practice for over a decade—and had reviewed literally hundreds of 
venture finance contracts, each with its own distinct variations—at the 
time when she sat down to propose a particular innovation. In addition, 
each interviewee was able to tap an extensive professional network of 
other attorneys to obtain feedback on drafts and proposals. If contractual 
innovation is viewed purely as an exercise in technical drafting, 
therefore, there can be little doubt that attorneys with extensive 
experience at large law firms possess a number of advantages vis-à-vis 
other potential innovators when it comes to developing successful 
contractual innovations. 
However, several of our interviewees stated that they ignored 
technical comments from other attorneys—or consciously declined to 
seek such comments from other attorneys—in order to keep the contract 
language simple. This desire for simplicity is attributable, at least in part, 
to the unique needs of this particular contracting community. These are 
deals for relatively small amounts of money and there is a strong desire 
to keep legal fees and friction low so as to execute the transaction 
quickly. In addition, these contracts are highly unlikely to wind up in 
litigation, which means that the simplicity of the contracts is unlikely to 
create problems in the event of a legal dispute.245 Nevertheless, the fact 
that these innovators prized simplicity over technical mastery indicates 
that, to a significant extent, they were focused on the perceived needs of 
end users of the contracts, rather than those of other attorneys.246 
Indeed, our interviews suggest that the perceived needs of contract 
users dominated the drafting process carried out by attorneys. Each of 
the contract innovators that we interviewed worked closely with an 
 
 244. Choi et al., supra note 1, at 8. While some scholars have argued that law firms also have the ability to 
spread the costs of innovation across multiple clients, it is not clear that this cost-spreading ability played a 
significant role in facilitating the innovations discussed herein. The time that an attorney spent innovating, we 
were told, was typically billed to a single client. Telephone Interview with Yoichiro Taku, supra note 161. 
Telephone Interview with Carolynn Levy, supra note 158. Telephone Interview with Noah Pittard, supra 
note 208. While this does not mean that cost-spreading does not help to facilitate innovation in other 
contexts, it suggests that it is not a particularly important factor in the venture finance context. Accordingly, 
we do not discuss it at any length. 
 245. See Coyle & Polsky, supra note 83, at 302 (discussing reputational concerns that reduce the 
amount of litigation between venture capital investors and founders). 
 246. Several of our interviewees sought to downplay the extent to which an innovative contractual 
provision represented a break with the past. Instead, they emphasized the connection between the old 
and the new. If attorneys whose stock and trade is to provide legal advice to cutting-edge companies 
find it challenging to develop truly novel contract forms, then one is pessimistic that attorneys in other 
industries will do so. 
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investor or an entrepreneur who provided feedback on the draft. Taku 
partnered with Ressi, a serial entrepreneur, to develop the convertible 
security. Levy worked closely with Y Combinator partners and co-
investors when drafting the SAFE. Pittard coordinated the release of the 
Series AA documents with TechStars. Wang sought and obtained the 
blessing of many of the lead seed funders before he publicized the Series 
Seed. Absent buy-in from prospective users, these innovations will 
wither on the vine. Non-lawyers are therefore in a position to exercise 
tremendous influence—both directly and indirectly—over attorneys 
seeking to develop useful contractual innovations. 
When asked about their motivations, the individuals we interviewed 
all noted that the innovations they proposed were designed to solve a 
specific problem. In the case of the SAFE and the convertible security, 
the problem was the fact that convertible notes were required to include 
an interest rate and a maturity date. In the case of the Series AA and the 
Series Seed, the problem was the higher cost and complexity of using a 
classic set of Series A documents to provide financing to very early-stage 
ventures and the dizzying array of stripped down alternatives that had 
arisen in response to this problem. Problem solving was not, however, 
the only factor driving them. Wang stated that he viewed the production 
of the Series Seed as a project in which he was able to leverage a very 
specialized skill set—a deep knowledge of early-stage venture finance—
into a set of documents that would benefit the entire venture finance 
community.247 Levy reported that she viewed herself as drafting “for a 
community rather than a client.”248 And although none of our 
interviewees specifically mentioned this as a factor, several comments 
made in passing suggested to us that yet another factor encouraging them 
to innovate was a desire to obtain greater professional prestige. There is 
considerable caché, after all, in pioneering an innovation that 
subsequently becomes the industry standard. 
C. Substitution as Contractual Innovation 
To date, most studies of contractual innovation have focused on the 
process of incremental change, that is, on determining precisely when a 
particular contract term was added to or removed from a particular type 
of contract. Contractual innovation can, however, also occur when the 
contracting parties choose to substitute one type of contract for another, 
as when a property owner’s decides to enter into a ninety-nine-year lease 
with a potential buyer instead of selling the land outright. While such a 
decision would certainly qualify as a contractual innovation, it would be a 
qualitatively different type of innovation than adding a clause to an 
 
 247. Telephone Interview with Ted Wang, supra note 223. 
 248. Telephone Interview with Carolynn Levy, supra note 158. 
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existing sales contract.249 While this process of innovation by 
substitution—as contracted to innovation by incremental change—has 
attracted virtually no academic attention to date, the discussion of 
venture finance contracts in the previous Parts suggests that innovation 
by substitution can and does occur. 
Historically, investors in early-stage technology companies tended 
to invest in common stock. Over the past decade, however, these 
investors have increasingly chosen to structure their investment in 
convertible notes, convertible preferred stock, or novel contract types 
such as the SAFE. This substitution of one type of contract for another 
that accomplishes the same basic end, we argue, constitutes a form of 
contractual innovation. Once this insight is recognized, the process of 
innovation is revealed to be far richer and more complex than previously 
appreciated. As incremental changes to the text of a particular type of 
contract make that type more attractive to investors, the investors will 
begin using that type of contract to the exclusion of others. This shift 
may, in turn, lead to further incremental changes in the text of still 
another type of contract, which ultimately leads to yet another 
substitution. It is not enough, in other words, to explore the process of 
contractual innovation exclusively by looking to textual changes within a 
given subset of contracts.250 In certain areas—and venture finance is 
undeniably one of these areas—the process of evolution and change may 
be fully grasped only if one also takes into account the possibility that 
incremental changes may ultimately lead contract users to substitute one 
type of contract for another. The decision to structure one’s investment 
in the form of convertible debt rather than convertible equity, in 
summary, is as significant an innovation as the addition or deletion of a 
pari passu clause from a sovereign debt contract. 
Conclusion 
Over the past decade, a number of technological advances have 
fundamentally altered the ways in which early-stage technology 
companies are operated and funded. On the one hand, the convertible 
note—an instrument previously used primarily in the context of bridge 
funding—has become more complex and is now commonly used to 
provide seed funding to these companies. On the other hand, classic 
Series A form financing documents—instruments previously used 
principally by venture capitalists to fund companies at a later stage in 
their development—have been simplified and are now commonly used 
 
 249. See Davis, supra note 2, at 89 (“Innovation means any change that is both novel and likely to 
be adopted by a group of prospective users.”). 
 250. See Choi et al., supra note 1, at 24–36 (comparing innovations in sovereign debt contracts 
governed by New York law to innovations in sovereign debt contracts governed by English law). 
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by seed investors who would prefer to invest in equity. While these shifts 
have fundamentally reshaped the contractual infrastructure of early-
stage venture finance in the United States, existing theories of 
contractual innovation can only partially explain the changes to these 
venture finance contracts. They also fail to fully capture the role played 
by attorneys in bringing these changes to fruition. While further research 
is needed in order to fully understand the complex (and occasionally 
bewildering) process by which venture finance contracts change over 
time, this Article represents an important first step in bringing new types 
of contracts into the fold of the fast-growing body of scholarship that 
explores the process of contractual innovation. 
